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 The main goal of this research is to clarify the concept of “middle power” and 
to employ the idea to understand the diplomatic strategies that allow so called secondary 
powers, which are countries without substantial national power, to actively exercise 
remarkable influence in international politics. In general understanding, this diplomacy 
is called “middle power diplomacy” or “middlepowermanship” which particularly 
means diplomacy excising influence and taking international initiative through 
international co-operation and regimes.
 1
 This diplomacy is distinguishable in that it is 
not based on overwhelming national power such as military power, but on persuasion 
and reconciling with other actors.
2
 By such activities, some secondary countries 
achieved considerable involvement, strong influence, and impressive positive reputation 
in the world despite their intermediate or small national power. This research examines 
in what conditions some of these secondary powers can employ this type of active 
international policies and show remarkable influence in certain international issues.  
 Research for this project involved three processes of examination in five 
chapters on the topic of middlepowemanship, presented in five chapters. Part I of the 
                                               
1
 The term “middlepowermanship” is suggested by Robert Cox in “Middlepowermanship, Japan, 
and Future World Order.” International Journal 44 (1989):823-862.  
2
 Andrew F. Cooper, Niche Diplomacy: Middle Powers after the Cold War (London: Macmillan 
Press), 1997. 
iv 
thesis contains history and literature review of the idea “middle power”. Based on the 
review of history and literature, this research assumes the middle power diplomacy or 
middlepowermanship in this research has theoretically four main features. Firstly 
middlepowermanship means taking leadership employing cooperation with other actors, 
including other countries and international organizations, and international institutions 
rather than just its own national power. Secondly, this type of leadership tends to be 
entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, which does not always require massive 
national power and resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic option is basically available 
to very wide range of countries, classified as “possible middle powers” in this research, 
as one of the policy options. Fourthly, the country applying middle power diplomacy 
does not always describe itself as “middle power”; in addition, the country calling itself 
“middle power” is not always conducting middle power diplomacy. The political 
rhetoric “middle power” and middle power diplomacy is not always inter-related. Lastly, 
only under certain conditions this policy is chosen and successfully practiced. One 
distinguishable feature of this research is that it is assuming the neither “possible middle 
powers” nor self-indicated middle powers always apply middle power diplomacy. The 
“possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an available option.  
  
v 
 The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an 
available option and decide whether middlepowemanship strategy is practicable and 
effective or not on a case by case basis. This research suggested that if “possible middle 
powers” seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select issues and 
approaches which their limited diplomatic resource can accomplish. For this selection 
of issues, firstly, there needs to be domestic agreement. In other words, domestic 
support and available diplomatic resource have to become available on the right 
political timing. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available 
resources strongly affect the countries‟ approaches to the large scale international policy 
and new projects. Secondly, “possible middle powers” need to persuade other 
international actors for support and co-operation to excise international leadership 
because of their limited national and diplomatic capability.  
 In Chapter 5 of this thesis, a case study is presented on Japanese diplomacy on 
the idea “human security”. Japanese active policies under the name of human security 
were middlepowemanship because of the three following features. Firstly, Japanese 
human security policy has been conducted in cooperation with the United Nations and 
other countries. Secondly, the Japanese government was seeking the entrepreneurial 
leadership and influence in these policies. Thirdly, the government consistently put 
vi 
emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and limited its 
initiative to economy related issues.  
 This case study focuses on factors underlying the policy decision choosing 
middlepowermanship. Prime Minister Obuchi‟s leadership backed up his intellectual 
advisors who were supporting the idea of “human security” matched the political timing 
brought by the Asian financial crisis and the Ottawa Process in 1997. The constraints 
and available diplomatic resources led the Japanese government to take the 
middlepowermanship approach.  
The government had certain constraints due to the constitutional restraints in 
military activities and complexity of relationships with neighboring countries. These 
restrictions on the approaches resulted in Japan pursuing limited initiative only on 
economy related issues even though the idea of human security contains “freedom from 
want” and “freedom from fear.” Combining with the existing Japanese Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) policies and upcoming ODA policy reform realized the 
human security as a large scale international initiative, such as the Trust Found for 
Human Security. In the international sphere, support from other countries and the UN 







 I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Dr Andrew Cooper for his 
supervision and vital encouragement and also to Dr Kimie Hara, my co-supervisor, 
whose understanding and support are greatly appreciated. Also, I would like to thank Dr 
Alistair Edgar for becoming the third reader and giving me great advice on my research. 
I gratefully thank Dr David Welch, and Dr Norihito Kubota, Dr Veronica Kitchen for 
their constructive comments on this thesis and for the inspiration they shared. I, also, 
thank Dr Nutbrown, for his continued support and motivation. 
 I wish to acknowledge and thank in particular Chris Miller, Alice Wan, Joy 
Cheng and Blair Forsyth-Stark for their valuable advice on my style and English 
grammar. Without their excellent support, I would not have been able to complete my 
thesis in the second language. I convey special acknowledgements to my best friends in 
Canada, Aditi Date, and Zoe Zhang for being always at my side with selfless support in 
countless ways.  
 I was extraordinarily fortunate in receiving support from the Rotary 
International Foundation during my two years in Canada. I could never have embarked 
on this journey, personally and academically without the opportunity Rotary gave to me. 
viii 
It is a pleasure to express my gratitude to the sponsor club, the Rotary Club of 
Nishinomiya-Koshien and sponsor District 2680, also the host club, the Rotary Club of 
Waterloo and host District 7080. My two years in Canada have been blessed with 
cheerful and helpful Rotarians and their families. Their kind hospitality filled my two 
years with great and precious experiences, meeting new people and experiencing a new 
culture. This two-year period in Canada has been definitely life-changing time and it 
will remain in my memory as one of the most important part of me.  
 My parents and my sister in Japan deserve special mention for their support 
and guidance throughout the years. I would also like to wholeheartedly thank my family 
in Canada, Oksana Goertzen, Chris Frey, Olec, Orest, John and Stella. Their thoughtful 
support brightened my life and greatly helped me to get through the challenging time 
finishing this thesis.  
 Finally, I would like to thank everybody who contributed to the completion of 
my Master‟s thesis. Also, I would like to acknowledge and thank Osaka University the 
Association of International Public Policy for the permission to reprint the article, Michi 
YAMASAKI, “Rethinking Hierarchical Understanding in International Relations,” 




Table of Contents 
List of Tables……..………………………………………………………xii 
List of Figures………………………………………………………...…xiii  
Introduction ...................................................................................................... 1 
Analytical Process ..................................................................................................... 4 
Chapter 1 The Discourse of “Middle Power” in International Politics ......... 9 
1. The “Middle Power” in the League of Nations and the United Nations ............. 10 
1.1 The Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations ................................. 10 
1.2 The San Francisco Conference and the United Nations .................................. 13 
2. “Middle Power” in the Cold War ...................................................................... 22 
2.1 Changing Usages of the Term ........................................................................ 22 
2.2 Self-professed “Middle Power” ..................................................................... 24 
2.3 Recognized “Middle power” .......................................................................... 27 
3. “Middle Powers” and End of the Cold War ....................................................... 28 
4. Analysis of the Political Usages........................................................................ 31 
Chapter 2 The “Middle Power” in Academia ............................................... 35 
1.  The Concept of “Middle” ................................................................................. 36 
2.  Confusion with the Political Term..................................................................... 37 
3.  The Separation from Political Rhetoric ............................................................. 41 
3.1 Hierarchical Model ........................................................................................ 42 
3.2 Normative Model .......................................................................................... 43 
3.3 Behavioral Model .......................................................................................... 44 
4.  “Middle Power” in Canadian Academia ............................................................ 46 
5.  Analysis of the Academic Usages ..................................................................... 50 
Chapter3 Hierarchical Assumptions in International Relations Studies..... 53 
1. Hierarchical Understandings of International Society in IR............................... 54 
1.1 “Great Powers” as Major Players in International Politics .............................. 54 
1.2 “Middle Powers” and “Small Powers” as Other Powers ................................. 56 
x 
2.  Ways of Classification ...................................................................................... 63 
2.1 National Power .............................................................................................. 64 
2.2 International Institutions ................................................................................ 71 
2.3 Perceptions and Discourses............................................................................ 74 
3. Hierarchical Assumptions in IR and Middle Power Studies ................................. 78 
Chapter 4 “Middle Power” and “Middlepowermanship” ........................... 83 
1.  “The Scheme of Gradation” and “Possible Middle Powers” .............................. 84 
2.  “Middle Power” and Leadership ....................................................................... 88 
3.  Agenda Setting Process Choosing “Middlepowermanship” .............................. 97 
4.  Case Selections for Case Studies .................................................................... 105 
Chapter 5 Japanese Diplomacy for “Human Security” ............................. 109 
1. Japan and Middle Power Diplomacy for “Human Security”............................... 109 
1.1 The Concept of Human Security .................................................................. 109 
1.2 Japanese Policies for Human Security.......................................................... 113 
1.3 Options for Japanese Diplomacy.................................................................. 118 
2. Agenda-Setting Process for Middle Power Diplomacy ....................................... 130 
2.1 Problem Stream ........................................................................................... 131 
2.2 Political Stream and Policy Entrepreneurs ................................................... 135 
2.3 Policy Streams ............................................................................................. 142 
3. International Conditions .................................................................................... 152 
Conclusion .................................................................................................... 156 
Appendix ....................................................................................................... 162 
1. The List of “Small Powers” in narrow definition ......................................... 162 
2. The list of Non-Permanent Member of the UNSC ....................................... 167 
3.  List of Prime Ministers of Japan after the Second World War ...................... 171 
4.  Time table of Japan‟s Human security Policies from 1994 to 2007. ............. 173 
5. Permission Letter for Reprinting from Publisher ......................................... 174 
Bibliography ................................................................................................. 175 
Books .................................................................................................................... 176 
Articles ................................................................................................................. 179 
Official Documents ............................................................................................... 185 
xi 
Web sites ............................................................................................................... 186 
 
xii 
List of Tables  
 
Table 1 Three perspectives for Canadian Foreign Policy Studies ....................... 49 
Table 2 Four Approaches and Their Focus on the Idea of “Middle Power”........... 50 
Table 3  Dispersion of Evaluated National Power in 1978 and 1991. .................. 69 
Table 4 Examples of Great Powers in Institutional Classification......................... 72 
Table 5  Three Ways of Hierarchical Categorization ........................................... 79 
Table 6 Indicators for “Scheme of Gradation” ..................................................... 88 





List of Figures 
 
Figure 1  “Power Image Approach” and Middle Power Studies .......................... 49 
Figure 2 Hierarchical Image of the International Society ..................................... 63 
Figure 3 Middle Power studies and Hierarchical Understanding .......................... 80 
Figure 4 “Possible Middle Powers” ..................................................................... 85 
Figure 5 Each Category‟s General Behavioral Patterns ........................................ 89 
Figure 6 The Modified Three-Stream Framework to Understand Approach 
Selections .................................................................................................. 103 
Figure 7 Two Levels of International Leadership Policy Conditions .................. 105 
Figure 8 Three International Policy Directions for Japan ................................... 129 






 The main goal of this research is research is to clarify the concept of “middle 
power” and to employ the idea to understand the diplomatic strategies that allow so 
called secondary powers, which are countries without substantial national power, to 
actively exercise remarkable influence in international politics. In general understanding, 
this type of diplomacy is often referred to as “middle power diplomacy” or 
“middlepowermanship” which particularly means diplomacy to exercise influence and 
take international initiative through international co-operation and regimes in certain 
issues.
3
 This diplomacy is distinguishable in that it is not based on overwhelming 
power such as military power, but on persuasion and reconciling with other actors.
4
 
Such diplomatic style is often employed by so-called “middle powers” which consists of 
a relatively powerful group of secondary powers. This research examines why some of 
these secondary powers can employ active international policies and show remarkable 
influence in certain international issues. 
 In world politics, there are cases in which secondary countries show massive 
involvement, strong influence and have impressive positive reputation in the world 
                                               
3
 The term “middlepowermanship” is suggested by Robert Cox. Robert Cox, “Middlepowermanship, 
Japan, and Future World Order,” International Journal 44 (1989):823-862.  
4
 Cooper, Niche Diplomacy. 
2 
despite their intermediate or small national power. For example, in the area of arms 
control, Canada and Norway took initiative in the Ottawa Process in 1997 and Norway 
again showed strong leadership in the negotiation process for the treaty to limit the 
usage of cluster bombs in 2008. Such cases are quickly increasing especially after the 
Cold War because more diplomatic strategies of each country stress influence and 
co-operation with other actors rather than physical national power such as military 
strength. Thus, the importance to understand such diplomacy is increasing in these 
decades of uncertain global politics after the Cold War. By examining such 
middlepowermanship, factors promoting international co-operation and conditions for 
secondary powers to exercise international influence will be clarified.  
 The limited number of remarkably powerful countries can no longer be 
assumed to be the determining actors in world politics. Traditionally, international 
relation studies (IR) have been focusing on such powerful countries. For a more 
practical understanding of changing international relations, we have to comprehend the 
international behaviors of other countries. In the modern world of interdependence, 
even powerful countries cannot always push though their interests any more. In addition, 
the sources of power and influence in international relations are changing. Joseph Nye‟s 
argument over “Soft Power” demonstrates that the sources and methods to exercise 
3 
power are becoming more diverse.
5
 Moreover, there are much more secondary and 
small countries than great powers in the world. Considering the increasing number of 
cases where secondary countries have had significant impact and the changing nature of 
power, systematic analysis to find the general characteristic of secondary countries‟ 
diplomatic strategies to exercise influence is necessary to understand modern 
international relations.  
  This research examines how some of the secondary or intermediate powers, 
so-called “middle powers,” demonstrate strong influence in certain cases despite their 
intermediate national power. In international relations studies middle power diplomacy 
has not been receiving fair attention because, traditionally, most of the theoretical 
studies of IR focus on politics among great powers such as the larger European 
countries, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. Also, the idea 
of “middle power” is still vague and unstable in IR. Cases of middle power diplomacy 
were discussed separately in each issue. For example, middle power diplomacy in the 
realm of arms control is studied as a case of arms control rather than a case of middle 
power diplomacy.  
 Middle power studies also have been attempting to answer this question, how 
                                               
5
 Joseph Nye Jr., Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs), 
2005. 
4 
some of the secondary or intermediate powers, so-called “middle powers,” demonstrate 
strong influence in certain cases despite their intermediate national power. However, 
existing middle power studies do not always share the basis of analysis because of the 
ambiguous definition of the concept of “middle power.”
6
 The unclear analytical 
framework also impedes case-comparison and theoretical development. Furthermore, 
because most of the case studies in middle power literature are on diplomacies 
surrounding Canada and Australia, the applicability of the idea of middle power in 
international relations studies is still limited
7
.   
 Therefore, this research suggests a modified framework to understand middle 
power diplomacy. Examining the Japanese case with the improved framework clarifies 
the motivations and conditions in choosing middle power diplomacy. 
 
Analytical Process 
 The main aim of this research is to present conditions that allow intermediate 
powers to exercise strong influence and take initiative in certain issues through 
international co-operation, regimes, or organizations. This research is conducted with 
the following three analytical processes in five chapters; chapter 1 and 2 review the 
history and literature relating to “middle power”, theoretical examinations are contained 
                                               
6
 Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power.” Canadian Foreign Policy 7 (1999):73-82. 
7
 Michaels F. Hawes, Principal Power, Middle Power, or Satellite? (Toronto: Canadian Institute of 
Strategic Studies, 1984), 3-4. 
5 
in chapter 3 and 4, and the case study of Japanese diplomacy promoting the idea of 
human security in set out in chapter 5.  
 In Part I, chapter 1 and chapter 2 review political usages of the term “middle 
power” and middle power studies. This review indicates there are doubled confusions 
and preconceptions in middle power studies and images, and, also, examine the 
underlying historically. There is confusion surrounding the political term and the 
academic analytical tool because of the origin and beginning of middle power studies. 
The term of “middle power” received attention from academia after the World War II 
because this term was frequently used in political contexts by mainly Canada and 
Australia to obtain international recognition as an influential actor in international 
politics and also to identify themselves as bigger contributors than other minor 
countries in international society, organizations or alliances. In particular, middle 
power studies in the post war period were motivated by the political usages and 
diplomatic reputation of Canada, also, even some of publication at the time was a part 
of political advocacy claiming Canada‟s role and right as a “middle power”.  
 In Part II, chapter 3 and chapter 4 is a theoretical examination and presentation 
of a modified analytical framework. Chapter3 locates middle power studies in IR from a 
theoretical perspective and shows that middle power studies are overlapping with IR‟s 
6 
attempts to classify countries. However, IR research projects attempted to classify and 
label countries in a hierarchical order and hardly move to examine the characteristics of 
diplomatic strategies of each category. In addition, any of major approaches to classify 
countries shared in IR cannot categorize countries objectively due to the problems of 
each approach. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are flexible and 
changing along with issues and time periods. Considering the aim of this research to 
understand the middlepowermanship, this research focuses on this behavioral approach 
as the basis of analysis. Also, this research assumes that the behavioral approach in 
middle power studies holds the possibility of original academic contribution based on 
the comparison of middle power studies and other IR work. 
 A modified theoretical framework is suggested based on the investigation of 
both international relations literature and middle power studies in chapter 4. With bigger 
capabilities, countries generally become more inclined to act unilaterally and less likely 
to compromise because they do not always need other actors‟ support in international 
issues. On the other hand, once powerful countries attempt to take leadership, it usually 
proved to be a wider scale and stronger leadership. On the contrary to these powerful 
countries, if intermediate powers seek to show strong influence and leadership, they 
have to select issues and approaches with which their limited diplomatic resource can 
7 
accomplish. 
 Intermediate powers need certain basic national power and domestic and 
international support to take leadership in the world issues. This research categorizes 
countries with certain power as “possible middle powers.” One distinguishable feature 
of this research is that it is assuming the “possible middle powers” do not always apply 
middle power diplomacy. The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship 
strategy as an available option and deciding whether middlepowemanship strategy is 
practicable and effective or not in each case. These “possible middle powers” have two 
levels of requirements for successful implements of international leadership and 
influence oriented policies. Firstly, domestic agreement and available diplomatic 
resource must be combines with the perfect political timing in the domestic agenda 
setting process. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available 
resources strongly affect the approaches to the large scale international policy and new 
projects. Secondly, because of their limited capability, intermediate states need to 
persuade other international actors for support and co-operation in order to exercise 
international leadership.  
 Part III, and chapter 5 presents the case study on the Japanese policy on human 
security. The case study involves Japanese diplomacy accepting and exporting the new 
8 
concept of “human security” as an effective diplomatic tool in the 1990s. The case study 
focuses on factors underlying the policy decision. Domestic leadership by policy 
practitioners advocated the new concept of “human security” and domestic conditions 
and available diplomatic resources realized the advocated idea in practice. In the 
international political sphere, support from other countries and organizations made 
practicable the large scale international policy conducted by Japan. 
 In conclusion, by integrating the three parts of examination above, this research 
clarifies the factors that lead secondary powers middle power diplomacy in certain 
issues, which is to exercise strong influence and take initiative through international 
co-operation, regimes, or organizations. This conclusion has implications for factors that 
facilitate political actors‟ active commitment along with other actors to international 
society.  
9 
Chapter 1                                           
The Discourse of “Middle Power” in International Politics 
 
 
 The term and idea of “middle power” has been frequently employed in political 
contexts after the First World War. The political images and meanings of the term were 
socially constructed through continual political usages. In the beginning, the term was 
employed by self-professed middle powers to distinguish themselves from other minor 
states and claim more powerful and influential positions in the international society. 
Politicians and diplomats of self-professed middle powers had desired to obtain 
recognition as major contributors and particular positions in international organizations. 
As for the political usages, the Canadian Government is one of the main political 
advocates of the idea of “middle power.” The continuous political usages of the term 
and Canadian diplomatic achievements constructed certain positive images of “middle 
power” in political contexts. Once positive images of the political term were widely 
accepted, several countries started to employ the phrase to utilize its positive images. 
These countries applied the term not only to claim the rights and positions of bigger 
international actors as opposed to other minor countries but also to acquire the positive 
10 
images and status of the “middle power.” 
 
1. The “Middle Power” in the League of Nations and the United 
Nations 
 The political usages of “middle power” are found in the negotiation process to 
establish the League of Nations and the United Nations. This term was frequently 
employed by self-professed middle powers to claim powerful and influential positions 
in the new world systems after the two world wars.   
 
1.1 The Paris Peace Conference and the League of Nations  
 The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was the first global attempt to assess the 
relative status of states in real world politics
8
. In the context of the League of Nations, 
the idea of middle power meant intermediate powers between the five great powers and 
minor states or secondary powers next to the great powers.  
 At the beginning of the Conference, the assumed relative positions of the states 
involved were clearly represented by the number of allocated delegates. Only five 
countries, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan, were 
allowed to send five delegates each to the Conference. Belgium, Brazil, and Serbia were 
allowed three representatives. Twelve countries, China, India, Canada, Australia, South 
                                               
8
 Jonathan Ping, Middle Power State Craft: Indonesia, Malaysia and the Asia-Pacific (Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), 34. 
11 
Africa, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Portugal, and Romania, had two seats each. 
Only one delegate was allocated for each of the remaining twelve participant countries. 




 From the beginning of the negotiation process, it was clear that the five great 
powers would have exclusive statuses and the permanent seats on the executive 
committee of the League of Nations. One major concern involved devising a method to 
assess appropriate status in the League of Nations for lesser powers. Possible secondary 
powers, such as Spain, Hungary, Turkey, Poland, and Brazil, received attention from the 
five great powers at the Conference. 
  The British Government‟s proposal suggested adding rotational seats. These 
extra members in the executive committee would be selected from each of the 
intermediate countries, which were introduced with the terms “middle power” and 
“minor states
10
.” The United States, especially President Wilson, supported this idea and 
recognized the existence of intermediate-rank states in his country‟s draft
11
. However, 
these concessional attitudes of the great powers were part of their strategies to ensure 
their own control over the new international organization. In fact, the United Kingdom‟s 
                                               
9
 Ping, Middle Power State Craft,34 
10
 Carsten Halbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (London: McMillan, 1984), 48.  
11
 Halbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics, 49; C. Howard-Ellis, The Origin, Structure, 
and Working of the League of Nations, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1928), 82. 
12 
proposal for the additional seats for lesser powers explained the benefits of having such 
seats: “the intermediate and minor states receive a very substantial representation on the 
league, and [can] not complain that they are at the mercy of the Great Powers
12
”.  
 As a result of discussions among the five great powers, other member countries 
were assigned four rotational seats in the Council of the League. This system of 
rotational seats caused contention between states that describing themselves as middle 
powers.  
 Four countries, Spain, Brazil, Belgium, and China, received the first four seats 
at the first Assembly in 1920. In this Assembly, attending countries had numerous 
arguments over the selection guidelines of four non-permanent members. Various 
countries suggested that population, size, economic potential, geographic location, and 
regional or cultural representation should be deciding factors. Many countries insisted 
themselves as the appropriate non-permanent members. 
 Some countries claimed the right to be considered middle powers right next to 
the great powers. China and Brazil put emphasis mainly on their size and populations. 
Spain and Persia stressed their leadership in the Latin American area and Islamic 
countries. According to these self-indicated middle powers, middle powers deserve 
                                               
12
 Halbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics,48. 
13 
treatment almost equal to that of great powers in the League of Nations
13
.  
 Other smaller members opposed these claims and the creation of distinctions 
between middle powers and small powers. Smaller countries explained that there should 




 The use of the term middle power and the recognition of the existence of such 
group of countries in the League of Nations affected academic work. Researchers in 
Europe and North America primarily, such as C. Howard-Ellis, C. K. Webster, S. 
Herbert, and Waldo E. Stephens, examined the idea and the term of middle power. 
However, these scholars in the 1920s and 1930s were interested mostly in middle 
powers in the system of the League of Nations. Holbraad concluded his analysis of 
middle power studies in the 1920s and 1930s by noting that “they [researchers/writers 
of the period] rarely ventured into generalizations and speculations about typical 




1.2 The San Francisco Conference and the United Nations 
 After the Second World War, international society sought a new world order 
through the United Nations. The negotiations and preparations for establishing the new 
                                               
13
 Ibid, 54. 
14
 Ibid, 55. 
15
 Ibid, 56 
14 
international organization began in 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks with the attendance of the 
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China. This initial meeting was 
succeeded by the San Francisco Conference in 1945, at which the discussion was open 
to 50 countries.  
 At the San Francisco Conference, the term and the idea of middle power in 
international relations received attention, again. At this time, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, and some other countries claimed the roles and rights of middle powers in the 
United Nations. In the quest for a new international order after the war, the idea of 
middle power once again appeared to be useful to policy practitioners of particular 
countries. Representatives of self-professed middle powers employed the concept to 
distinguish their own countries from other small countries, considering themselves as 
more powerful and influential participants in world politics.  
 As is well-known, the United Nations of today also grants exclusive positions 
on the Security Council to the five great countries: China, France, Great Britain, the 
Soviet Union, and the United States. The institutionalization of international hierarchy 
in the United Nations was one of the key issues in the San Francisco Conference, as 
well as in the Paris Peace Conference. In the San Francisco Conference, non-permanent 
seats on the Security Council and some special seats in the specialized councils, such as 
15 
the Economic Council in the United Nations, were discussed. 
 In the negotiation process of establishing the United Nations, some countries, 
such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand, professed themselves to be middle 
powers that were more influential and powerful players than other small member 
states
16
. They tried to make a distinction between themselves and other small countries 
because they hoped to ensure official positions with more power and influence than 
other typical small countries in the United Nations.
17
 These self-professed middle 
powers described themselves as having the capability and will to play as significant 
roles as great powers in different ways in world politics on particular issues, even 
though middle powers could not compare with big countries in total national power. 
 Among these would-be middle powers, Australia and Canada showed 
remarkable desire to occupy special seats next to the great powers in the United Nations. 
The Australian government was yearning for middle power status as a representative 
and a regional leader of the Pacific region and suggested adopting a regional principle 
of representation. In addition, as an elected member of the Executive Committee of the 
Conference, Australia attempted to reduce the veto rights of the great powers and 
                                               
16
 Ibid, 59; G.P. Glazebrook, “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System” International 
Organization 1 (1947): 307-315 
17
 G.P. Glazebrook, “The Middle Powers in the United Nations System,” 312-315. 
16 
enlarge the roles and rights of lesser powers in the United Nations
18
.   
 Dr. H. V. Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs at that time, argued 
at the Dumbarton Oaks negotiations the importance of a regional representative 
principle to accommodate additional members of the Security Council. In his words: 
 
One important point is that the representatives of the smaller 
powers on the executive authority should be adequate to ensure 
a balanced outlook on world affairs and so increase confidence 
in all executive decisions [of the Security Council]. Further the 
executive should be so constituted that no distinct region of the 





The Canadian government also invoked functional principles of representation in the 
United Nations on many occasions. According to its explanation, the representation in 
the Security Council and councils in particular areas in the United Nations should be 
determined “on a functional basis which will admit to full membership those countries 




 According to the Canadian Government, Hume Wrong and Lester Pearson, 
who were Canadian diplomats at that time, first introduced the idea of the functional 
                                               
18
 Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics,61 
19
 Ibid, 60 
20
 Ibid, 57; F.H. Soward and E. McInnis, Canada and the United Nations (New York: Manhattan 
Publishing Co., 1956), 10. 
17 
principle to distinguish Canada as a middle power from other minor powers
21
. Then, in 
1943, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, in the Canadian Parliament, presented the 
functional principle to the Canadian people. Externally, in 1943, King and the Canadian 
Government promoted the functional idea to the great powers at conversations during 
the Dumbarton Oaks meeting.
22
 
 The Canadian government‟s understanding of the functional principle had 
fundamental similarities to the “functionalism” proposed by David Mitrany in 
international relations studies in 1943. However, the Canadian government suggested 
the functional principle for different political goals. Much academic work agreed that 
Mitrany‟s functionalism had affected Canadian diplomats‟ and political leaders‟ thought; 
however, it was modified in accordance with Canadian diplomatic goals at that time
23
. 
  The functionalism was presented in Canada‟s amendment proposals for 
regulations on the United Nations‟ council representation. Canada stressed that 
influential positions in international organizations had to be based not only on the 
overall size or power of each country, but on functions and contributions in each issue. 
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Although the idea of sharing roles internationally was common to Mitrany, Canadian 
functionalism aimed to formalize international hierarchy in each area based on 
contributions of countries in that area. Conversely, Mitrany argued that international 
organizations could share in particular states‟ functions in world affairs with states and 
international organizations
24
.   
 The wish of Canadian and Australian policy practitioners was prompted by 
their pride as two of the biggest suppliers to the allied forces in World War II and their 
concerns for their new positions in international society. Before the War, these two 
countries were considered as new participants who had recently become independent 
from the United Kingdom in 1931. International society did not treat Canada and 
Australia, two newly independent young countries, as actual members of the 
international community. However, due to the war, while European countries had been 
seriously damaged during the war both economically and physically, the Canadian and 
Australian economies had rapidly developed in the armaments boom
25
. As for Canada, 
it became the second major provider of war supplies and food; furthermore, Canada 
financially supported the Marshall Plan. Based on these facts, Canada and Australia 
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insisted on their right to be major members almost as significant as great powers and 
claimed to institutionally assure such positions in the new world order. In fact, the 
Canadian Prime Minister Mackengie King feared for the Canadian position in the new 
international organizations and stated that Canada would be “relegated to the same rank 
as the Dominican Republic or El Salvador”26 comparing to each country‟s war effort. 
PM King wished Canada to be recognized as a more important and influential member 
of international society than other smaller countries. Francis Forde, the Australian 
Deputy Prime Minister of the day, also emphasized his county‟s war effort:   
 
Certain powers, not classified as great, have proved by their record in 
two world wars that they not only have the capacity but also the will 
to fight in resistance of aggressors threatening the world with tyranny. 
These powers are in a sense proved veterans in the security of the 
world. They are in truth security powers. They have a claim to 




 Despite these countries‟ efforts, none of the middle powers achieved their goals 
of assuring recognition and special positions within the United Nations. Although the 
regional and functional principles, which were suggested by Australia and Canada in the 
negotiations, survived in the United Nations, these did not ensure these countries‟ 
positions in the organization. Article 23 of the UN Charter gave priority to the 
                                               
26
Stephane Roussel and Charles-Philippe David, “Middle Power Blues: Canadian Policy and 
International Security after the Cold War,” American Review of Canadian Studies 28 (1998): 8. 
27
 Halbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics,61. 
20 
functional principle in the election of non-permanent members to the Security Council. 
However, shortly after the first election, in which Brazil, Egypt, Mexico, Poland, the 
Netherlands and Australia was chosen to be non-permanent members of the Security 
Council, some groups of countries, such as the Eastern European, Latin American and 
Commonwealth countries, made claims for continuous representation from their 
groups
28
. In addition, by the early 1950s the General Assembly and the Security Council 
frequently become immobilized because of the Cold War. The increasing number of 
members of the United Nations from the later 1950s made the assembly more disjointed. 
Eventually, the bloc system introduced in the Security Council in 1963 eliminated the 
functional principle because the blocs in the system were based on regional bases
29
.  
 As the United Nations started off, so-called middle powers played active roles 
in various committees and councils in the first few years. Although middle powers 
could not receive any official status, they actually occupied significant positions in 
international organizations in the beginning. For example, Argentina, Brazil, Canada, 
and Poland were members of the committee of United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA) in 1946
30
. The final 1946 resolution of the Atomic Energy 
Commission widely reflected middle powers‟ opinions and was based on a Canadian 
                                               
28
 Ibid, 63. 
29
 Ibid, 63. 
30





 There are three reasons why these middle powers failed to gain recognition and 
official positions in the new international organization. Firstly, unlike in the case of the 
League of Nations, the great powers opposed the creation of middle-power positions in 
the United Nations. Even though France occasionally supported Australia‟s argument in 
the negotiations, the great powers were consistently against making special positions for 
middle powers. Holbraad analyzed that the great powers considered that positions for 
middle powers might weaken their own rights and dominance as great powers
32
. 
Secondly, self-professed middle powers neither formed a coalition group nor united 
their claims.
33
 Even Canada and Australia, the leading promoters of the idea of middle 
powers, suggested different principles to classify themselves as middle powers. The 
Netherlands argued that middle powers consistently deserve adequate representation
34
. 
Mexico suggested responsibility-based elections for the non-permanent members in the 
Security Council
35
. The would-be middle powers did not even recognize each other 
because they barely had common grounds for their claims as middle powers. 
Furthermore, each possible middle power was also a member of various bloc-voting 
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groups, such as Canada and Australia in the British Commonwealth; Mexico in the 
Latin American States; and Poland in the Soviet Bloc. Thirdly, lack of a shared 
definition of middle power made it difficult to recognize the existence of that group of 
countries for both self-preclaimed middle powers and other countries.  
   
2. “Middle Power” in the Cold War 
2.1 Changing Usages of the Term  
  Both the usages of the term and the countries assumed to be middle powers 
changed during the Cold War. After the San Francisco Conference, it became more 
difficult for self-described middle powers to establish formal positions in the United 
Nations. Lack of officially recognized middle power countries made the meaning of the 
term more flexible. Once the Cold War began, bloc politics and the stagnating United 
Nations made formal middle power status in the United Nations less important. 
Self-professed middle power countries started to show their presence not only in the 
United Nations, but also in other international activities. 
 Politicians‟ intentions behind the use of the term middle power were also 
becoming varied at this point. Politicians and diplomats had desired to obtain 
recognition as major members of, and particular positions in, these international 
organizations during the negotiations for the setup of the League of Nations and the 
23 
United Nations. Their claims were based mainly on war effort in the previous war or 
national power, which consisted of such factors as population, economic resilience, 
military strength, and geographical size. 
 During the Cold War, the focus in defining middle powers was slowly shifted 
to a country‟s roles in international organizations, such as its ability and willingness to 
mediate in conflicts, as well as military power, size of territory, or population
36
. For 
example, in a 1965 conference, Canadian Prime Minister Lester B. Pearson described 
Canada as a middle power based on its diplomacy as well as its military power, size, 
and geographical location: 
 
We are “middle” in the sense, I suppose, of possessing the 
average of the conventional ingredients of power. We are big in 
geography --- both in geographical size and geographical location, 
but that is reduced by our comparatively small population. We are 
powerful in trade, in resources, in living standards. We have 
relatively little military power of our own, but the use of what we 
have has been important because of the way we have used it:  in 
association with others; in time of peace, in combination with 
others or with the United Nations. I think in a sense, and we can 
say this without boasting, we have in the last 20 years or so at 
times been powerful in our diplomacy. Our country is just about 
the right size and of the right importance to be powerful in 




 In addition to the Canadian example, director of a Mexican think tank Mario 
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Ojeda Gomez provided an interesting example of a new focus for defining middle 
power. In his article, he delivered the idea that Mexico is a possible middle power 
because of its capability and willingness to be a mediator.
38
 Although, he admitted that 
Mexico did not have military and economic capabilities to be a middle power, he 
considered Mexico as a mediator- middle power.   
 
2.2 Self-professed “Middle Power”  
 During the Cold War, Canadian international mediating activities in the 1950s 
had a significant impact on the usages and images of the term “middle power”. After the 
San Francisco Conference, Canadian politicians and diplomats continued to describe 
their country as a middle power.  
 The Cold War narrowed the scope of middle powers‟ policies because most 
self-professed middle powers at the time of the San Francisco Conference were tied to 
either of the superpowers. Even with the limited policy options as an ally of the United 
States and a member of the Commonwealth, Canadian mediating efforts achieved a 
certain level of success on some occasions, such as the 1956 Suez Crisis, the divisions 
between East and West related to new memberships in the United Nations, the 
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conflicting perspectives of North and South on development aid issues.
39
 In particular, 
Canadian contributions to avoiding war between Great Britain, France, Egypt, and 
Israel and the establishment of the basis for the Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) in the 
1956 Suez Crisis were two of the landmarks in the history of international relations.  
 Based on these diplomatic achievements and the reputation they brought to 
Canada, some Canadian politicians and scholars at the time considered these 
international meditational, institutional-based activities to be the best argument for 
describing and defining middle power diplomacy in the 1960s. John Holmes, a 




 Starting with these arguments in Canada, politicians in various other countries 
began to apply the term “middle power” to identify their own countries in various 
contexts as well as those referring to international meditational activities or 
contributions to PKOs. The idea of “being middle” could mean being in a moderate or 
neutral position in the tensions between the West and East, being in the middle and 
bridging developed and developing countries in North-South issues, being a regional 
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leader, and playing meditational roles between countries in conflicts. These meanings of 
the idea of middle power were employed both in combination and separately. For 
example, the Australian External Affairs Minister in 1964, Sir Garfield Barwick, defined 
his country as a middle power based on various aspects:  
 
[Australia] is clearly [a middle power] in the general sense in 
which the expression is used. But also it has common interests 
with both the advanced and the underdeveloped countries; it 
stands in point of realized wealth between the haves and the 
have-nots. It is at one time a granary and a highly industrialized 





 As another example, Takakazu Kuriyama, officer of the Japanese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, described Japanese diplomatic strategies as “one of the most successful 
cases of foreign policy of a minor states.
42
” Speeches at the time show that Japanese 
policy practitioners thought Japan was a middle power because of their country‟s high 
position in the group of minor countries even though Japan had neither shown interest 
in PKOs or international meditational acts nor been famous for these diplomatic efforts 
in the world stage until the 1990s
43
. 
 In addition to the changing meaning of the term, the countries applying the idea 
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of middle power also changed during the Cold War. India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sweden, 
and Yugoslavia are good examples of these new middle power countries. Some of those 
countries were newly emerged middle powers because of becoming independent, 
economic development, or policy direction changes. Some states or non-aligned groups 
also played mediators‟ roles in international conflicts.  
  
2.3 Recognized “Middle power”  
 The shift of the focus for defining middle power caused a significant change in 
the political usages of the term. Before the Cold War, middle power, as a political term, 
was applied to claim for particular countries their own rights or positions in 
international systems. However, during the Cold War, some of middle powers were not 
self-professed ones but were nevertheless recognized as such. India provides one clear 
example of this unique usage of the term middle power. A Canadian diplomat, John H. 
Holmes, praised India and its Prime Minister Nehru for their international meditational 
activities and called India a middle power, although Nehru himself desired India‟s future 
world role to be that of a great power
44
. Two examples of his writing before the 
independence of India from Britain demonstrate his wish.  
 
A free India, with her vast resources, can be a great service to the 
world and to humanity. India will always make a difference to the 
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world; fate has marked us for big things. When we fall, we fall 





Leaving these three big countries, the United States of America, the 
Soviet Union and China, aside for the moment, look at the world. 
There are many advanced, highly cultured countries. But if you 
peep into the future and if nothing goes wrong, wars and like-- the 




 One case from Canadian political rhetoric change provides another example of 
middle power not self-professed but recognized as such by others. Once, the Canadian 
government officially stopped describing itself as a middle power during the Cold War. 
In the times of Prime Minister Trudeau, the government suggested a retreat from middle 
power diplomacy: “Familiar notions of Canada‟s Role as a middle power, middleman or 
“helpful fixer” or of influence as a policy objective were to be questioned.”
47
 However, 
scholars and a lot of academic work still considered Canada as a middle power based on 




3. “Middle Powers” and End of the Cold War  
 The end of the Cold War changed the world system and diplomatic strategies of 
most countries in the world. In this international situation, the usages and meanings of 
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the term middle power were modified again. Witnessing the cooperation among the 
great powers in the Gulf War, both policy practitioners and scholars thought 
international power politics would change drastically. Many countries started seeking 
their new roles and positions in the coming new world system after the Cold War.  
 Because of the drastic change of the international bipolar system, many 
countries expected more active multinational co-operations. Without the tension 
between superpowers, other countries including “middle powers” expected more 
opportunities for their international activities and wider policy options. For example, a 
former Canadian diplomat stated that “world conditions have changed radically, at least 
for the moment. Superpowers are more likely to welcome middle power mediation.”
49
  
 Self-professed middle powers in the Cold War period, such as Canada and 
Australia kept applying the term middle power to describe their international roles and 
positions. For example, the Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney emphasized that 
Canada had the will and capability to act in the United Nations after the Gulf War:  
 
As middle powers, we must ensure our interests will 
continue to be protected by the international legal system. 
We must use our strength to support a revitalized United 
Nations system, to improve the position of those less 
well-equipped to help themselves”
50
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 Also, South Africa was thought to be newly „emerged‟ as a middle power in 
terms of its mediating and bridging roles in international society. Foreign Minister Nzo 
stated as follows:  
 
South Africa is a developing country with certain of the 
attributes of a developed or industrialized country. This 
enables us to understand, and relate to, the concerns of both 
the South, as well as the North, and therefore to play a pivotal 





 At the same time, the term of middle power obtained other political meanings 
after the Cold War. The term appeared in the contexts of “soft” security issues as well as 
PKOs or meditational acts in the times of the Cold War. The first background to this 
change was shifting international interests. Relatively new “soft” security issues such as 
human rights, protection of the environment, prevention of conflict and human security 
started to receive international attention as well as core security issues after the Cold 
War. Because many self-professed middle powers had been advocating these “soft” 
security issues even during the Cold War, addressing these new issues became one of 
the ways to distinguish “middle powers” with a “moral” foreign policy
52
. The fact that 
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Canada and Norway, which were often mentioned as typical middle power in various 
contexts, took initiative in the Ottawa Process in 1997 enhanced this image of “middle 
power.” Also, Lloyd Axworthy, the Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, built a link 
between Canadian “middle power” diplomacy and human security issues. According to 
his article, Canadian middle power diplomacy, which always “stressed the importance 




 Recently, Canadian Prime Minister Stephan Harper advocated Canada‟s role as 
a “middle power” and the importance of co-operation with other “middle powers” in 
September 2007:  
Working with other middle powers Canada can and is making a real 
contribution to protecting and projecting our collective interests, 
while serving as a model of a prosperous, democratic and 




4. Analysis of the Political Usages 
  This chapter reviewed the political discourse surrounding the idea of “middle 
power.” The term was first introduced in the negotiations for establishment of the 
League of Nations in international politics. In both of the preparation meetings for the 
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League of Nations and the United Nations, the term middle power was employed by 
self-professed middle powers to gain official recognition and positions in the new 
international organizations.  
 In the Cold War period, the term was connected to the images of contributors to 
PKOs or mediators in international conflicts. These images were based on several 
prominent achievements in these issues made by self-professed middle powers such as 
Canada and Australia. Because of the high recognition of diplomatic achievements of 
self-professed “middle power” and the positive images of the term “middle power,” 
some other countries newly describe themselves as “middle power” to obtain its status 
and positive reputation. At the same time, because of these images of the term “middle 
power,” some active small countries were called “middle power” even if those countries 
themselves did not describe themselves as such. The end of the Cold War and changed 
international situations added new meaning to the term which is a country actively 
involved in soft security issues, such as environmental issues, arms control, and human 
security.  
  The term “middle power” as a political term employed by self-professed 
middle powers did not have a specific or shared definition in political contexts. Because 
each policy practitioner employed the idea with various political intentions and 
33 
individual definitions, the meanings of the term have been changing throughout its 
history depending on the user and context. The main motivations of using this concept 
in political contexts is to obtain international recognition as an influential actor in 
international politics and also to identify themselves as bigger contributors than other 
minor countries in international society, organizations or alliances.  
 The second point to note is that the political meaning and images of the 
“middle power” were constructed mostly around Canadian activities in the world. As 
the history of the term in political contexts revealed, the image of middle power 
strongly connected to active participation in PKOs and mediations started by the 
Canadian activities in the Suez Crisis. Also, Canadian and Norwegian diplomacy at the 
Ottawa Process is one of the most influential factors connecting the term “middle power 
diplomacy” to “soft” security issues including human security.   
 Thirdly, a lot of academic research on the idea of middle power is motivated by 
the political usages of the term. However, the interpretations of the idea of “middle 
power” in academia and in politics are not always the same. Some academic research 
assumes certain countries based on that county‟s self-description; however, both the 
users and intentions of the phrase are changing even in the same country. The various 
usages and ambiguous definitions of the term in political contexts threw many 
34 
researchers into confusion.  
 As a last point, because of the uncertainty of the idea, academic literature 
especially after the 1990s emphasized that political discourses and academic usages of 
the term middle power should be clearly distinguished
55
. The political usages of the 
term can be considered as a diplomatic strategy which controls images and employs 
reputations in world politics. However, it has to be separated from countries with middle 
strength national power or middle positions in the world because not all the political 
usages are representing that country‟s national power or relative position. In some 
recent cases, the usages of the idea of “middle power” in academic work and politics are 
becoming less interconnected. For example, although the Canadian government never 
officially applied the term “middle power” in the context of human security policies, 
many academic studies on this issue assumed Canada as “middle power” and Canadian 
policy on human security as “middle power diplomacy.
56
” 
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Chapter 2                                          
The “Middle Power” in Academia 
 
 
 In the beginning of the study of “middle power,” there was no clear distinction 
between the political and academic term for “middle power.” The underlying reason is 
that discussions over the idea of middle power after the Second World War in academia 
were motivated by the frequent political usages of the term. Also, many researchers of 
the term in early middle power studies used to be advocators of these political usages, 
such as Canadian diplomats and politicians who employed the term in political contexts 
to describe Canadian diplomacy. As the studies of the middle power concept developed, 
objectivity-oriented research and research outside of Canada have accumulated; 
however, because of this origin of the academic studies, the concept of middle power in 
politics and academia is still confused. The concept of middle power still involves two 
coexisting dimensions; as an instrument for academic analysis and an ideology or 
rhetoric of foreign policy. 
 
36 
1.  The Concept of “Middle”  
  In the very beginning, the concept of “middle power” was used in the academic 
attempt to understand international society in hierarchal order. The concept of “middle” 
has been randomly found in some studies of international relations from the fifteenth 
century, however; the literatures of “middle power” in the first period were neither 
systematic nor related to each other
57
.  
 The concept of “middle power” in its infancy can be found in the studies of 
politics mainly in modern Europe. For example, in eighteen-century Europe, some 
studies classified political actors into three groups: big, middle, and small
58
. As another 
example, in some work in political science in the 19
th
 century, the concept of “middle 
power” was applied to Germany at that time, due to its geographically middle location 
and the relatively middle strength of its national power.
59
   
 In this period, middle power countries were assumed to act strategically 
because of the insecurity of being in the “middle” position in international society
60
. 
Countries in the middle place in international hierarchy were thought to be declining 
powerful countries or growing small countries
61
. In addition, from other countries‟ point 
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of views, middle power countries are easier to be invaded than powerful countries and 
more beneficial than small countries for invading countries.   
    
2.  Confusion with the Political Term 
 The basis of middle power studies after the Second World War was created by 
Canadian policy practitioners who worked for the Canadian Government mainly during 
the „the Golden Age‟
62
 of the 1950s and 1960s. For example, a publication titled 
Canada: A Middle Aged Power by Canadian diplomat John H. Holmes, which advocated 
the international roles of Canada as a “middle power”, has been one of the most 
frequently cited pieces of literature in middle power studies.
63
 Other than this 
publication, a lot of Canadian publications issued by politicians and diplomats, such as 
Lester B. Pearson, Paul Martin, G.P. Glazebrook, and Lionel Gelber constructed the 
basic form of the concept of “middle power” in early age of middle power studies. 
During these two decades in the post war period, Canadian diplomacy and published 
work released by Canadian policy practitioners established basic images of “middle 
power” in academia and politics.  
 In the beginning of the study of middle powers, many publications argued 
about international roles Canada was playing or had to play. Some papers employing 
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this usage of the term were part of political advocacy rather than academic policy 
analysis at the time. Publications and speeches in this perspective shared the notion that 
Canada, as a middle power, had particular roles in the international community based on 
its own interest and capability. Typically, Paul Martin described the support of 
peace-keeping operations as “Canada‟s role” in his book.
64
 This perspective of the idea 
of middle power is called the functional/role model.  
 This early approach defined the idea of “middle power” with three basic 
features: functionalism, international mediations, and active support for international 
organizations. This perspective put emphasis on the international functions and roles 
carried by “middle powers” in the international community.  
 The functionalism principle is one of the basic ideas of “middle power.” 
Although his functionalism in middle power studies partly refers to the functionalism 
suggested by David Mitrany, the meaning is fairly different. After World War II, 
Canadian policy practitioners insisted Canada‟s and other middle powers‟ roles and 
rights should be determined “on a functional basis which will admit to full membership 
those countries large or small which have the greatest contribution to make to the 
particular object in question.”
65
 Canadian policy practitioners stressed that influential 
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positions in international organizations had to be based not only on overall size or 
power, but also on functions and contributions to each issue.  
 After the successful implementation of the peace keeping plan in the 1956 Suez 
Crisis, Canada recognized itself as a “model peacekeeping power.
66
” In reflection of 
these international meditational efforts, the term middle power was connected to the 
meditational actors in conflicts and peace-keepers in academic and political contexts; 
“the middle powers found themselves frequently cast in mediatory positions.”
67
 In 
addition to such peace-keeping activities, Canada put emphasis on international 
institutions such as the United Nations and international alliances in accordance with its 
international activism, which were considered to be “the dominant characteristics of 
behavior” of Canada and other middle powers.
68
 
 In most studies of this perspective in the early post war period, Canada is the 
middle power in question. Most research focused on explaining Canadian international 
activities. As Michel K. Hawes indicated, of most publications issued by policy 
practitioners at the time, “no matter how cleverly constructed, most of those works are 
                                                                                                                                         
1945,” International Journal 58 (Spring 1963): 137-139. 
66
 Maureen Appel Molot, “Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit,” 79-80; Andre P. Donneur and 
Caroline C. Alain, “Canada: A Reassertion of Its Role as a Middle Power,” in Philippe G. Le Prestre 
ed., Role Quest in the Post-Cold War Area, 226 
67
 Holmes, “Is There a Future for Middlepowermanship?”, 15. 
68
 Michel Tucker, Canadian Foreign Policy: Contemporary Issues and Themes (Toronto: Mc 




” Also, they hardly had theoretical examinations on 
Canadian foreign policies; thus, analysis in this perspective cannot generalize to other 
countries or other issues. Although some publications applied this approach of putting 
emphasis on middle powers‟ functions and roles to other countries, such as Mexico and 
Australia, these attempts are a minority at this stage.
70
   
 The image of “middle power” had symbolic functions to unite the various 
domestic communities of Anglo Canadian, French Canadian and new increasing 
immigrants inside Canada. These functions encouraged the policy practitioners of 
Canada to advocate domestically the term through publications in academia in the post 
war period. In addition, especially after the Suez Crisis, the symbolic term of “middle 
power” role or responsibilities attracted the domestic support and attention to the 
foreign policies. The image of middle power Canada as a responsible member of the 
international community “was crucial in creating a domestic consensus in support of 
extensive involvement in the maintenance of the international order.”
71
 In fact, John W. 
Holmes‟ argument against Prime Minister Trudeau‟s rejection of the “middle power” 
rhetoric demonstrated that some researchers believed the domestic political impacts of 
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the idea of middle power. The Trudeau government issued Foreign Policy for 
Canadians which was considered to be “designed to revise the terms in which foreign 
policy was understood”
72
 in academia. In fact, PM Trudeau took a different approach to 
international activities, such as his leadership for “Peace Initiatives” which aimed to 
construct peaceful communications between East-West countries without applying the 
term “middle power.
73
” In Holmes‟s article advocating the political usefulness of the 
term of “middle power,” he clearly assumed the term not as an academic concept but as 
a political symbolic term. He noted that the image of Canada as a middle power 
“[encouraged] a wallflower people to get responsibly involved in keeping the peace and 
unleashing the world economy.”
74
   
 
3.  The Separation from Political Rhetoric 
 The academic discourses of “middle power” became varied with the 
accumulation and development of academic studies of the concept. In addition to the 
earlier perspective on the idea of middle power, the functional/role model, three more 
perspectives on the concept of middle power emerged in middle power studies 
literature.
75
 These three perspectives were constructed mainly by researchers unlike the 
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first perspective which was constructed mainly by policy practitioners.  
 
3.1 Hierarchical Model 
 The first new perspective is based on national power and called “hierarchical 
model.” In many cases, relative ranking of countries based on national power is one of 
the guidelines for categorizing countries. For example, in Carsten Halbraad‟s 1984 book, 
he listed eighteen countries, including Japan, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, 
and Brazil, as middle powers based on population and GNP.
76
 Bernard Wood applied 
GNP as an indicator in his 1990 research
77
. Some other research applied objective 
indicators and other factors in combination. For instance, R.G. Riddell defined middle 
powers by “their sizes, their material resources, their willingness to accept responsibility, 
their influence and their stability.
78
”  
 Although the use of middle power based on national power is different from its 
use as political rhetoric, few academic research projects attempted further analysis 
employing the concept of middle power based on national power. Moreover, because 
the national power indicators were different in each, these research projects were hardly 
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compatible. Also, the national power itself is contextual and changing.  
 
3.2 Normative Model 
 The second perspective pays attention to domestic political culture and 
normative aspects of middle power diplomacy and is called the “normative model.” 
This approach considers that being in the middle based on the national power and 
political culture of some middle powers result in humanitarian international activities 
including foreign aid. For example, Western Middle Powers and Global Poverty 
examined foreign aid policy in Canada, Norway, Sweden, the Netherlands, and 
Denmark.
79
 These studies, particularly Middle Power Internationalism, assumed 
middle powers, at least some of them, are “more responsive to humanitarian values than 
most, particularly larger states.”
80
 From this view, the notion of “good citizenship” was 
often emphasized. This vision of “good citizen” countries in the international 
community is attached to liberal and humanitarian norms, and also contributions “to 




 Literature in this group was not exactly based on political usages of the term 
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“middle power”; however because of the notion of “good citizenship” and emphasis on 
the normative diplomacy of middle powers, this approach is often confused with the 
political rhetoric. Also, the reason why certain middle power countries have normative 
political culture and values unlike other countries has yet clarified in these research 
projects.  
 
3.3 Behavioral Model 
 The last perspective focuses on the behavioral patterns of middle power 
countries. As this view after the 1980s is called “new breed,” this perspective is 
different from others in several points. In this understanding of middle power, the 
observations of international behaviors underlie the definition of “middle power”
82
. 
Middle power countries‟ own ways of leadership, which are different from those of big 
countries in international relations, are emphasized as “middlepowermanship”. In the 
perspective of “middlepowermanship”, the concept of leadership is the foundation of its 
argument. The term of “international leadership” can be found in studies of other issues 
in political science. Leadership can be defined as “the power of one or a few individuals 
to induce a group to adopt a particular line of policy
83
”.  
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 This view attempted to distinguish the political term and the academic concept. 
The studies of this view are “largely comparative, creating the basis for more secure 
generalizations and new insights concerning middle power behavior.”
84 
The studies 
accepting this view compare several case studies of different countries and have 
theoretical orientations to understand general characteristics of middle powers. For 
example, Andrew F. Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Richard Nossal conducted case 
studies of Canada and Australia in Relocating Middle Powers, Cooper also edited Niche 
Diplomacy which consists of eight case studies of nine countries, and Middle Power 
Statecraft written by Jonathan H. Ping has the cases of Indonesia and Malaysia. In this 
view, the term middle power “shifted from being an expression of a specific role in the 
international community to a descriptor for specific „middle-state‟ behavior.”
85
 
Typically, Relocating Middle Powers applied Bernard Wood‟s definition of the middle 
power behavior: “their tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international 
problems, their tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, 




 Major criticism of this approach pointed out that this perspective has a circular 
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reasoning for the middle power behavior.
87
 These research projects examine and define 
general middle powers‟ characteristic behavior by analyzing several countries which 
they assumed to be “middle powers.” In fact, most of the research did not show the 
reason underling the case selection clearly.   
 
4.  “Middle Power” in Canadian Academia  
 As a perspective for understanding Canadian diplomacy, middle power studies 
are one of the three perspectives: which are “principal power,” “middle power,” and 
“small power.” Although, middle power studies were basically independent in their 
infancy, two other approaches for Canadian foreign policy were born as 
counter-arguments against the view that assumes Canada as a “middle power.” As Kim 
Nossal named these series of perspectives as the “power image approach,” these three 
categories are not based on exact national power
88
.  
 In the series of three perspectives, the perspective to see Canada as a middle 
power is also called the liberal internationalist perspective
89
. Because of the constraints 
on its capability, middle power Canada is more likely to co-operate and compromise 
with other actors.  
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 The first approach assuming Canada as a “small power” puts emphasis on 
vulnerabilities in Canadian foreign policy. This approach is called the peripheral 
dependence perspective which has a negative view on the Canadian dependency upon 
the United States. According to this argument, Canadian political and economic 
autonomy is declining because of the powerful neighbor United States. In this situation, 
Canada is becoming a country with small impact on the world or a “satellite” country of 
the U.S. For example, too much direct investments from United States could reduce 
Canadian capability and productivity, and also erodes Canadian political autonomy
90
. 
Although close military co-operation and membership in US-led alliances helps to 
secure Canadian national defense, at the same time, they limit Canadian diplomatic 
options. After this concern was officially stated in the Report of the Royal Commission 
of Canada’s Economic Prospect in 1985, this perception has been shared among 
economists, political scientists, and policy practitioners
91
.  
 The other approach assuming Canada as a “principal power” considers Canada 
as an independent and autonomous country. This approach is called the complex 
neo-Realist perspective which suggests Canada‟s growing ability and the decline of U.S. 
hegemony put Canada as a major power in the world
92
. In this view, Canada has a high 
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capability based on natural resources, advanced technology and a highly skilled and 
educated population
93
. As a principal power, Canada is conducting autonomous foreign 
policies in accordance with its interests and values. The basis of this argument was 
presented in James Eayrs‟ 1975 article “Defining a New Place for Canada in the 
Hierarchy of World Power” which insisted that Canada had more capability than was 
viewed in other perspectives
94
. In response to the situation that U.S. hegemony was 
declining, more scholars supported this view, assessing Canadian high international 
position and autonomous foreign policy for Canada
95
.  
 Table 1 below summarizes the three perspectives for understanding Canadian 
foreign policy. The Peripheral Dependence Perspective assumes Canada as a small 
country and concerns Canadian economic and political dependency on U.S. The Liberal 
Internationalist perspective assumes Canada as a middle power; thus this perspective is 
partly overlapping with middle power studies. In this perspective, Canadian diplomatic 
skills and patterns derived from its relative international position are mainly examined. 
The last perspective is Complex Neo-Realist Perspective, which considers Canada as a 
principal power based on its capability.  
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Table 1 Three perspectives for Canadian Foreign Policy Studies 
Assumption Perspective Focus 
Small Power Peripheral Dependence Perspective Canadian dependency on U.S. 
Middle Power Liberal Internationalist perspective  Canadian diplomatic skills 
Principal Power Complex Neo-Realist Perspective Canadian capability 
 
 
 Middle power studies and power image approaches can be located as Figure 1 
below. Middle power studies handling Canadian foreign policy can be considered as one 
approach in power image approaches to Canadian foreign policy. Some other 
approaches such as Canadian diplomatic history studies are not part of the “power 
image approach.” Also, there are some researches in middle power studies which focus 
on other countries or only general characteristics of middle powers. 
 









 Canada as  
a Principal Power 
 Canada as  
a Middle Power 
 Canada as  
a Small Power 
 Other countries as Middle Powers 
 Middle powers‟ general characteristics 
 
Middle power studies 
“Power Image Approach” 
 Canadian political history 
 Other approaches  
Canadian foreign policy studies 
Source: author 
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5.  Analysis of the Academic Usages 
 Originally, the concept of “middle power” was the idea and, in some cases, 
political rhetoric for understanding Canadian international policies. Until the present 
day, the term “middle power” has been defined and used in various ways depending on 
the contexts and users both in academia and politics.  
 In academic contexts, there are four approaches to the idea of “middle power.” 




Table 2 Four Approaches and Their Focus on the Idea of “Middle Power” 
Approaches Focus to define “middle power” 
Functional/Role model International/regional roles and functions. 
Hierarchical model 
Middle ranked countries based on calculated national power 
or imagined strength. 
Normative model Humane and normative diplomacy. 
Behavioral model Particular behavioral patterns in international relations. 
 
 
The first functional/role model focuses on particular countries‟ functions and roles in 
international community. This understanding of middle power was shared in academia 
and politics in the early period of middle power studies. The second hierarchical model 
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was based on national power. This view attempted to categorize countries into three 
groups judging from national power. In this approach the political term of middle power 
and the term of middle power based on national power were distinguishable. The third 
normative model put emphasis on the humane international policies of middle powers. 
According to this understanding, middle powers have original political culture and 
values unlike great or small powers. Because the grounds of this argument are still 
unclear, this approach is often confused with the political term of middle power 
describing particular countries as helpful or humane foreign aid donors or peace-keepers. 
The last perspective focuses on behaviors of middle powers. Research projects in this 
view attempted to separate the academic term and political term and construct a theory 
of middle power behavior. However, many case studies in these projects did not clarify 
the underlying reason for the case selection. Therefore, these studies still could confuse 
the political usages and academic usages through case selection. In fact, some research 
fell into circular arguments because of the case selection. 
 This review of literature revealed the fact that most of the middle power studies 
still have double confusions and preconceptions regarding the underlying two reasons. 
Firstly, there is confusion surrounding the political term and the academic analytical 
tool because of the origin and beginning of middle power studies. Middle power 
52 
studies in the post war period were motivated by the political usages and even some of 
publications at the time are a part of political advocacy claiming Canada‟s role and 
right as a “middle power”.  
 Secondly, there is certain confusion about middle power diplomacy and 
Canadian diplomacy. In most of the middle power studies, Canada is a typical example 
of a middle power because the early studies of middle powers were presented to 
describe and explain Canadian status and role as a middle power. Bases of middle 
power studies were created by Canadian policy practitioners who advocated the idea 
of the “Canadian role as a middle power”. Early middle power literature did not clarify 
the general “middle power diplomacy” and Canadian diplomacy. These early studies 
are the basis of most research and the confusion of early studies was passed on to the 
next generation. These tangled confusions are partly obstructing the further 
development of theoretical and objective approaches to the idea of “middle power”.  
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 Chapter3                                   




 The middle power studies are one academic subject of IR although middle 
power studies hardly locate themselves in international relations studies (IR). The very 
basic idea underlying middle power studies is that each state‟s relative rank and 
capability in the world determine the board patterns or direction of the county‟s 
international behavior
98
. This assumption is widely shared among IR research to some 
extent. Not only middle power studies, but also much IR research assumed hierarchical 
system in international society and labeled countries applying terms such as “great 
power,” “super power,” “middle power,” and “small power.” IR has three ways of 
classifying states into hierarchical order: national power, international institutions, and 
perceptions. These classifications have certain commonality with the ways to define 
middle powers in middle power studies although they hardly tried to find them. 
However, any of the three approaches classify countries in IR cannot categorize 
countries objectively. Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are 
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flexible and changing along with issues and time periods and focuses on understanding 
the behavior. 
 
1. Hierarchical Understandings of International Society in IR 
 As examined in chapter 1 and 2, the term “middle power” has been frequently 
used both in political and academic contexts with various definitions and aims. In 
academia, both middle power studies and IR in general has attempted to classify and 
label countries in hierarchical order in various contexts. In fact, terms such as “great 
power,” “super power,” “middle power,” and “small power” are frequently found in 
both IR and middle power studies, although these two academic group are not 
interconnected enough.  
 
1.1 “Great Powers” as Major Players in International Politics  
 In the history of IR, “great powers” have been thought to be the main players in 
world politics. Theoretical studies, particularly studies on polarity, have a tendency to 
focus on great powers because “[c]oncern with international politics as a system 
requires concentration on the states that make the most difference.”
99
 On the contrary to 
the attention on “great powers” as main players in international relations, other 
countries have not received equivalent attention in IR.  
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 Many theoretical studies in IR attempt to explain influential actors “great 
powers” and the politics among them. For instance, the “balance of power” suggested 
by H.J. Morgenthau is a framework to understand the political balance and international 
order kept by great powers. According to his work, smaller countries are merely tools 
for exchange in order to maintain stability
100
. Furthermore, polarity debates assume that 
only a limited number of countries maintain world order. Scholars who insist on the 
peace of a bipolar world, such as Kenneth Waltz and John J. Mearsheimer, do not 
concern with middle and small powers
101
. There are no vital roles for small states in the 
logic of hegemonic stability.  
 Within the category of great powers, there are various sub-groups of countries. 
Theoretical work on international relations has diverse definitions of “great countries,” 
on which they mainly focus. The term “great powers” can mean hegemony, bipolar 
super powers during the Cold War and the permanent members of the Security Council 
in the United Nations. In a broader sense, all the countries that are “less affected in 
conducting their own international policies than others, and affect others‟ international 
policies more than others” can be assumed as great powers.
102
 Researchers especially 
                                               
100
 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace 4th edition. 
(New York: Alfred.A.Knopf, 1969), 187.   
101
 Waltz, Theory of International Politics; John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York: WW Norton & Co Inc, 2003) 
102
 Yoshinibu Yamamamoto, Kokusaiteki Sougoizon (The International Interdependence) (Tokyo: 
Tokyo University Press, 1989), 113. 
56 
those who concerned with polarity debates, attempt to draw a clear line between great 
powers and super powers. For example, Barry Buzan and Kenneth Waltz distinguished 
super powers from great powers by the range of the specific countries‟ capabilities. In 
their argument, super powers are assumed to be all-round players in international 
politics; on the other hand, great powers need not necessarily have significant 




1.2 “Middle Powers” and “Small Powers” as Other Powers 
 Apart from these “great powers,” countries less powerful than great powers can 
be classified as “small power” in a broad sense. In this broad interpretation, the term 
“small power” could include any countries with relatively small populations, territories 
or economies in comparison to great powers. Some researchers apply this two tier 
classification which is “great powers” and “others” or “major powers” and “minor 
powers”. Others have three-tier classifications which have “great power,” “middle 
powers,” and “small powers.” Even in these three-tier classifications, the distinction 
between “middle powers” and “small powers” remains unclear.  
 The countries that are not great powers are many and diversified. The variety of 
possible states in the “others” category resulted in little academic work which attempt to 
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systematically examine the general characteristics of such powers‟ diplomacy.
104
 There 
are no shared definition of “small power,” or distinctions between “small powers” and 
“middle powers” within “minor power” category. However, most research had minimal 
agreement that failed states, weak states, and least developed countries (LDCs) are 
typically considered as small states in many cases.
105
 Thus, in “minor power” category, 
failed states, weak states, and LDCs are small powers in narrow meaning, and others are 
possibly other “small powers” depending on the definitions and “middle powers.” 
The United Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed 
Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States 
(UN-OHRLLS) describe the LDCs as follows: 
 
[T]he poorest and weakest segment of the international 
community. Extreme poverty, the structural weaknesses of their 
economies and the lack of capacities related to growth, often 
compounded by structural handicaps, hamper efforts of these 
countries to improve the quality of life of their people. These 
countries are also characterized by their acute susceptibility to 





UN-OHRLLS currently lists 49 LDCs states, such as Burkina Faso, Rwanda, Ethiopia 
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and Bangladesh comparing them in terms of their three-year average of their gross 




 The annual index of failed states issued by the policy journal Foreign Policy 
listed 60 countries as failed states, including Somalia, Sudan, Zimbabwe and Chad.
108
 
According to the “Failed States Index 2008,” failed or failing states have the following 
attributes: 
 
One of the most common is the loss of physical control of its 
territory or a monopoly on the legitimate use of force. Other 
attributes of state failure include the erosion of legitimate 
authority to make collective decisions, an inability to provide 
reasonable public services, and the inability to interact with other 




 In addition to these states, micro states are frequently considered as small 
powers. Countries with small population, small territory, or small economy are often 
assumed as micro or small state even if they are well developed and industrialized. In 
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the definition presented by the UN in 1969, countries with populations of less than one 
million are assumed to be micro states. This definition is widely accepted although the 
categorization of micro states is still a contested topic in IR.
110
 According to the United 
Nations Statistics Yearbook issued in 2008, 50 countries such as Cyprus, Qatar, and 
Iceland are examples of micro states with small populations
111
.  
  Several distinctive reasons underlying academic and political attention to small 
countries demonstrate the general characteristics of small powers. Firstly, because some 
small states are newly decolonized or became independent countries, they have different 
political characteristics such as ways of decision making and also require support to 
manage domestic issues and develop economically in some cases. Studies on such small 
countries attempt to reveal these countries‟ situations and needs for international support. 
For example, as Christopher Hill observed, models and theories applied in the context 
of developed or “old” countries cannot always apply to all of the developing or “new” 
countries because of the economic situation, lack of foreign policy resource, or 
immaturity of the government and elites
112
. Also, the motivation behind research 
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projects and publications by international organizations such as UNDP, World Bank or 
the Joint Commonwealth Secretariat/World Bank Task Force were that such projects 
“help inform continuing analysis and debate as small states themselves and multilateral 
and other institutions that provide external support and influence their development 
address the challenges they face.”
113
  
 Secondly, some small countries are receiving financial or humanitarian aid. 
Economic vulnerability is considered a general characteristic of small states.
114
 Smaller 
countries with smaller economies are more likely to face higher risks to their economy 
by external economics and incidents.
115
 Thus, in case of economic crises, natural 
disasters, or conflicts in neighboring areas, small countries are more likely to require 
external assistance. Some research projects are conducted to examine receivers of 
international aid in order to recognize the impacts of the support and develop more 
effective responses. For example, Assessing Aid issued by the World Bank studied small 
countries and stated that sound economic policy from the local government is an 
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essential condition for efficient financial aid.
116
  
 Thirdly, continuing conflicts in or between some small states or un-functioning 
governments in small states have the potential to destabilize neighboring areas or even 
the world. There is a notion that “nation-building has become an unavoidable burden, 
that its practitioners need to do a better job of applying the lessons from prior 
missions.”
117
 In addition, Sheila Harden indicates that small counties or other countries‟ 
conflicts over small countries could contribute to local or regional concerns.
118
 The 
threats of local and regional conflicts help motivate governments and organizations to 
arrange research institutes on small states including failed or failing states.   
 In sum, combining the existing literature‟s view, small powers are microstates, 
failed states, Least Developing Countries and domestically unstable or un-functioning 
countries because they were newly decolonized or became independent. Also many 
small powers were receivers of the international aid rather than donnors for its 
economic development, reconstruction after natural disaster or conflicts.  
 As this chapter revealed, widely accepted definitions of terms “great power,” 
“super power,” “middle power,” and “small power” have not yet been established in IR. 
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The existing images of hierarchical classification in international society can be 
summarized in Figure 1 below. Less than 20 countries in total out of 192 United Nations 
member states are great powers by a narrow definition. Research applying two tire 
classifications categorizes the other countries as “others.” Other research assuming three 
layers in international hierarchy distinguishes “middle power” and “small power.” 
Currently, 49 states are thought to be least developed countries according to 
UN-OHRLLS.
119
 Based on the research conducted by Foreign Policy, 60 countries are 
assumed to be failed and failing states. Based on the data issued by UN Statistics and 
UNITAR, 50 countries are micro states with one million or less populations. Because 
some of the countries of each category overlap, in total small powers are 125 countries. 
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2.  Ways of Classification  
 Labeling countries as “great power,” “middle power,” and “small power” 
means that users of these terms are categorizing countries into a few groups. However, 
IR researchers and policy practitioners are not always conscious that they are 
intentionally and unintentionally assuming hierarchy when they are referring to the 
phrases “super power,” “great power,” “middle power,” or “small power.” Thus, the 
users of the phrases do not always clearly present or not be conscious on how they 
classify states. Most of the usages are applicable to one of the three coexisting ways of 
(Source: author) 
192 UN  
Member states 
Small powers(narrow meaning, 124 ) 
 Micro states (50) 
 Failed states ( 60) 
 Least Developing countries (49) 
Great powers (narrow meaning) 
 Hegemony/unipolar (1)  
 Bipolar (2) 





















regional powers    
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classification. The most basic hierarchical classification is based on national power. The 
second one is an international institutional classification. The third classification is 
derived from perception and recognition. Each method of classification has advantages 
and disadvantages and two of them are common to the ways in the middle power 
studies.  
 
2.1 National Power 
 The most basic classification is based on “national power”. Some research 
applied single indicator of power, such as population, military power, or GNP to classify 
countries
120
. Other research applies some indicator in combination. However, “national 
power” is one of the most contested concepts in IR. Even leading IR textbooks had 
seventeen different definitions of power although it was usually explained as a basic 
concept.
121
 Power in IR is considered to have three basic features. The first one is 
power as capabilities, which are power resources including military power, economic 
power, population and natural resources.
122
 The power resources are conceived as the 
means to affect the behavior of others. The second form of power is influence, which is 
the power exercised in relationship between actors. The third one is structural power. 
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Susan Strange defined structural power as the power to decide how things shall be done 
and the power to shape frameworks in which states conduct international policies.
123  
 For international comparison of power, power has to be measured 
quantitatively. However, there are three remaining problems in measuring power in IR. 
Firstly, two of the basic aspects of national power, which are influence and structural 
power, have inherently subjective and immeasurable natures. Recently, Joseph Nye 
presented the concept of soft power which he defined as the ability to attract others to 
affect sense of value and ways of thinking.
124
 To observe how these aspects of power 
work, detailed qualitative research has to be done on each case. It is difficult to 
objectively measure their effects because they are psychological relations existing only 
between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised.
125
  
 The second reason underlying the difficulty of defining and measuring power is 
multiplicity of capabilities and unavailability of accurate data. For example, Hans J. 
Morgenthau listed eight elements of national power: geography, natural resources, and 
industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national 
morale, the quality of diplomacy.
126
 Among those, power resources, such as military 
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power, populations, and GNP, are more visible and recognizable than others and thus 
have received central attention.
127
 However, measuring and comparing those elements 
of capabilities all across the world have technical obstacles. For instance, even if data 
for the annual national defense budgets of particular countries were available they do 
not always fully represent the military strengths of these countries because military 
strength was the result of many components, such as the budget, the number of 
personnel, equipment, and even alliances. Furthermore, measuring and comparing 
capabilities is often hampered by the unavoidable bias of data that comes from different 
statistical methodologies depending on countries, organizations, and time.
128
 The data 
of less developed countries are typically less available or reliable. 
 The last point to be noted is the contextual and changeable nature of power. 
Fungibility of power, which is the ability to transfer or work as a replacement for other 
power resource, is one of the biggest contentions regarding the nature of national power. 
For instance, if the fungibility of military power is high, a state possessing military 
strength could have advantages even in non-military areas. Conversely, from the 
standpoint of assuming low fungibility, strong military force does not always affect 
other areas. Thus, a country‟s strength would vary depending on issues. Literature 
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which assumes a low fungibility of power resources is likely to focus on the contextual 
nature of power. One power resources‟ effects differ from age to age as well as from 
issue to issue. Many researchers agree that power has fungibility as well as a contextual 
nature in greater or lesser degrees.  
 Although there is no common agreement on the way to estimate national power, 
many research projects attempted to calculate and compare countries‟ respective 
power
129
. Among the various academic work, the equation form devised by Ray S. 
Cline is the most frequently cited in contemporary IR. Cline created the following 
well-known formula for measuring national power and used it in the ranking of more 
than 70 countries in his research. 
PP =（ C + E + M ） × （ S + W ） 
PP = Perceived Power, 
C = Critical Mass = Population + Territory 
E = Economic Power, 
M = Military Power, 
S = Strategic Purpose, 
W = Will to Pursue National Strategy 
 
 Table 1 is R. S. Cline‟s attempt to compare and rank states based on national 
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power in 1978 and 1991 in accordance with his formula.
130
 These two studies by Cline 
are one of the few works estimating and comparing the national power of more than 70 
states. Other than Cline‟s work, Correlates of War Projects at University of Michigan 
has a set of data
131
  
 The longitudinal axis and numbers on the axis of Table 2 represent evaluated 
value of national power. The numbers at the latitudinal axis represents the ranking of 
each state. The figures of national power in each study are better adapted to make 
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（Source：R.S. Cline, World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s; 
 The Power of Nations in the 1990s.） 





The results of Cline‟s two research projects show an even and continuous distribution of 
countries. The possible “great powers,” which occupy the top half of the table, are few 
in number in both 1978 and 1991. Other than these distiguishable few great powers, 
almost all states are dispersed evenly. Thus, a clear division between middle and small 
states cannot be observed in Table 1. If there were two or three distinct clusters, states 
could be categorized clearly and objectively as to their national power. Therefore, 
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because of the even distribution of states in terms of national power, three hierarchical 
classifications have unavoidable tendencies to be arbitrary, judging from the results of 
Cline‟s research.  
 A lot of previous IR work attempted to classify states based on power 
distribution. However, power has been one of the most important and contentious 
concepts because of the absence of a common standard. In addition, there are remaining 
methodological problems for measuring power. Despite of these problems, if Cline‟s 
studies of calculating national power are applied, grouping states into three categories 
based on national power cannot be objective. The hierarchical classification applying 
national power can be neither objective nor systematic as a basis of further research.  
 With awareness of those problems and limitations, this classification is still 
useful for specific aims. Broad comparisons of countries based on national power gives 
overall pictures of the world and general positions of particular countries
132
. Also, even 
research with subjective categorizations or definitions could make a significant 
contribution as long as possible bias and problems are clearly noted. Robert Koehane 
summarized such views as presented by David Vital, in that “a definition should be 
judged not only on the relevance of its categories but also on the power of the 
                                               
132
 R.P. Barston, Introduction in The other Powers: Studies in the Foreign Policies of Small States, 
18. 
71 
explanations that it suggests.”
133
 Furthermore, a country‟s strength in particular issues 
and time are measurable with specific aspect or indicators of national power although 
national power as a whole is immeasurable and contextual. For example, judging from 
GNP in 2007, United States, China and Japan are the three most powerful countries; 
however, Russia, Canada and Norway, the three biggest exporters of natural gas, thus in 
the issues of natural gas export, these countries could prove to be more powerful.
134
 
These facts are certainly useful in international economy for specific research aims.  
 
2.2 International Institutions  
 The second classification is based on international law and institutions. Some 
international institutions and treaties provide clear divisions between each group in the 
international hierarchy. The membership of the Security Council of the United Nations 
(UNSC) is a typical example of this second classification. The permanent membership 
with the veto power creates obvious differences in terms of political rights in the United 
Nations. Other than the UNSC‟s membership classification, possessing nuclear weapons 
within the system of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty institutionalizes international 
hierarchy between the haves and the have-nots in terms of nuclear weapons. In the 
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economic area, the membership of the G8 has rights and statuses for member states. For 
example, the members of the G8 have the right to attend and make remarks at regular 
meetings. Even if it is not clearly regulated by international law or institution, positions 
and achievements in international institutional activities often authorize a country as a 
major power in particular areas.  
 
Table 4 Examples of Great Powers in Institutional Classification 
UNSC G8 NPT 
USA USA USA 
UK UK UK 
France France France 
Russia Russia Russia 
China China China 
 Canada  
 Italy  
 Japan  
  
 Essentially, these categorizations are created by states, mostly powerful or 
influential states at the time in a particular area. As Patrick A. McCarthy indicated, 
many international organizations officially differentiate the major powers from others in 
particular way.
135
 Those categorizations inevitably represent power distributions among 
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countries at one time and in one area in accordance with the major powers‟ will. 
Therefore, those classifications are not applicable throughout time and issues. In fact, at 
the peace conference of Paris in 1919, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, 
Italy, and Japan obtained great power status and its exclusive rights; however, after 26 
years, during San Francisco conference the United States, the Soviet Union, Great 
Britain, and China established exclusive positions in the Security Council.  
 This categorization presents clearer groups of states than the other two methods 
of categorization. However, institutional classifications represent only one specific 
aspect of international hierarchy and are also affected by politics at some point in time. 
Therefore, those issue- and time-specific features of classification are not expandable 
into other issues or time.   
 Based on the advantages and disadvantages of this particular type of 
classification, positions in international organizations can explain how authority and 
effective influence in particular issues were constructed and worked in specific areas 
and time. Membership in one exclusive committee provides certain authority and 
influence to member countries in particular areas. Moreover, because institutional 
positions are stable in many cases, they offer practical understandings of back grounds 
of international politics to analyze particular issues. For example, information regarding 
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the members, observers and chair country of a G8 meeting makes it easy to interpret the 
selections of topics discussed in the meeting. 
 
2.3 Perceptions and Discourses 
  The third classification is based on perceptions and discourses. In this third 
way of classification, the discourses and understandings of the country in question 
determine its international position. There is surprisingly a lot of IR work which avoids 
presenting clear classification and relies on international and domestic perception or 
discourses.  
 The first group of researchers who apply this third way of classification 
stresses the role of social agreement or shared image in categorizing states. From 
historical IR perspectives, Martin Wight put emphasis on social agreement defining 
great powers.  
 
It is easier to answer [the question „what is a great power?‟] 
historically, by enumerating the great powers at any date, than by 





Even some of neo-realists who advocate scientifically precise research methods in IR 
                                               
136
 Martin Wight, Hedley Bull, Carsten Holbraad, Jack Spence, Power Politics (London:Continuum, 
2002), 41. 
75 
leave the classification of nations to perceptions.
137
 For example, as a representative of 
neorealism, Kenneth Waltz indicated the hierarchical understandings as follows:  
 
Historically, despite the difficulties, one finds general agreement 
about who the great powers of a period are, with occasional 
doubt about marginal cases… Counting the great powers of an 
area …[is an empirical question „what is a great power?‟] 
historically , by enumerating the great powers at any date, than 
by giving definitions, for there is always broad agreement about 




 The second standpoint of the third way of classification pays attention 
particularly to perceptions of domestic actors and self declarations. For example, Robert 
Keohane typically framed a small state as “a state whose leaders consider that it can 
never, acting alone or in a small group, make a significant impact on the 
system.”
139
Jeanne A. K. Hey‟s statement also represents this view: “states are deemed 
small not by any objective definition, but by their perceived role in the international 
hierarchy.”
140
 Robert Rothstein defined a small country as “a state which recognizes 
that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities and that it must 
rely fundamentally on the aid of others.”
141
 In addition to research focus on national 
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identity, the role theory suggested by K. J. Holsti also put emphasis on policy 
practitioners‟ perception of national role.
142
  
  The last group of researchers in this view focuses on others‟ recognition or 
international mutual understandings to classify countries. For example, Hedley Bull 
defined great power as a country which is “recognized by others to have, and conceived 
by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties.”
143
 Laurent 
Goetschel also described the small powers as “a state perceived as no danger to 
neighboring states.”
144
 According to Barry Buzan‟s recent work, the key idea of this 
view is “not just what states say about themselves and others, but how they behave in a 
wider sense, and how that behavior is treated by others.”
145
  
 Despite the fact that a lot of researchers employed the categorization based on 
perceptions and recognitions, one categorization can hardly expand to other research 
because this classification is inevitably arbitrary and fluctuating depending on time and 
person. In fact, a research conducted by Norman Z. Alcock and Alan G. Newcombe 
showed that the perception and images of great powers are different between people in 
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Canada and Latin America because of the difference in histories and backgrounds of 
these two countries.
146
 Various research methods, including the application of the 




  In addition to these academic usages, political leaders also employ the 
classification based on perceptions to describe their countries‟ international positions or 
status. However, distinctively, political usages are not always based on political leaders‟ 
or domestic perception. In politics, classifications of states are applied to construct the 
social agreements of international positions and status in some cases.  
 This classification has various usages although it also requires further research 
as well as the other two classifications. Policy practitioners‟ and domestic actors‟ 
perceptions on their countries‟ international positions play significant roles in the 
policy-making process and international negotiations. For example, countries with 
confidence in being a key player in a particular area, such as a key exporter of a rare 
natural resource or being a leading supporter of an international committee, are more 
likely to take initiatives and less likely to compromise in those particular issues. 
Moreover, by focusing on one specific point, such as self-recognition as a leading 
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county in a certain area, it might be possible to compare several countries‟ international 
activities or a county‟s policy in several issues.  
 
3. Hierarchical Assumptions in IR and Middle Power Studies   
 As this chapter revealed, not only middle power studies classify and label 
countries based on hierarchical assumptions, but many IR studies also categorize 
countries. In IR, “great powers” are relatively distinguishable because they have been 
the major focus in IR. Other than “great powers,” “small powers” and “middle powers” 
have not received equivalent attention in IR and do not have clear categorizations. Thus, 
although phrases such as “super power,” “great power,” “middle power,” or “small 
power,” are found in IR often, they remain unclear both in IR and middle power srudies.  
 There are three coexisting ways of classifications and each one includes 
arbitrariness problems although they have certain benefits as Table 8. The very basic 
hierarchical classification is based on national power using various data. The second 
one is an international institutional classification. The third classification is derived 
from perception and recognition among policy practitioner and people. Each ways of 
classification has problems although they also have effective way of usages. The first 
approach, national power approach provides researchers an overall picture of 
international society. On the other hand, there is no widely shared and agreed definition 
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or ways of measurement of power. Secondly, the approach is based on international 
institutions presents clear distinctions between groups; however, the fact that these 
international institutions were affected by the international politics especially influential 
actors‟ interests at the time when these institutions were established. The last approach 
based is on perceptions and recognitions suited for close decision making process 
analysis. However, because this classification is based on policy practitioners‟ 
recognitions and speeches, the categories are contextual and changing depends on time, 
issues, and person.   
 
Table 5  Three Ways of Hierarchical Categorization 






Data on national 
power factors 
Systems and structure 
of institutions 
Policy practitioner‟s 
speech, official documents 
Usage 
Grab a big picture  Shows clear distinction Suited for decision making 
process analysis 
problem 
Unclear definition of 
national power. 
National power is 
difficult to measure. 
International 
institutions are made by 
great powers at the 
time.  
Contextual and changing 
depending on cabinets and 
person. 
Comparing middle power studies‟ four ways of defining “middle power” and 
IR‟s hierarchical classifications of countries, three of the approaches are overlapping. 
(Figure 8) Many middle power studies have hardly tried to locate themselves in IR. 
(Source: author) 
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However, judging from the basis of the middle power studies, most of them are 
overlapping with the IR classifying countries. 
 
Figure 3 Middle Power studies and Hierarchical Understanding 
 
 
The attempts of middle power studies to define middle power based on national 
power can be seen a part of IR‟s attempt classifying countries in hierarchical order. 
Secondly, the functional model in middle power studies approaches to the idea “middle 
power” from the point of the roles in international organizations and society. In this 
Ways of Categorization in Middle Power Studies 
Ways of Categorization in  




















sense, functional model has the same view as the IR‟s classification of countries 
focusing on international institution. At the same time, the functional model includes 
policy practitioners‟ self descriptions of their countries and recognitions of roles in 
international organizations and society. Thus, the functional model could also be a part 
of perception and recognition approach to the international hierarchy in IR. The third 
approach, normative model in middle power studies are based on subjective perceptions 
and interpretations of political culture and self-images. As another feature of the 
“middle power” concept, the political usages of the idea and term could be integrated to 
the perceptional and recognition approach to the international hierarchy in IR.  
As this research revealed so far, not only middle power studies, but many IR 
research projects assume international hierarchy and the concept of “middle power” is a 
part of such assumptions. However, any of the three approaches classify countries 
cannot categorize countries objectively. Therefore, this research assumes classifications 
of states are flexible and changing along with issues and time periods to understand the 
behavior. 
As Figure 3 indicates, the behavioral approach to middle power is unique to 
middle power studies and different from other IR approaches. IR research projects 
attempt to classify and label countries in hierarchical order, hardly moved to examining 
82 
the general characteristics or behavioral patterns of each category. IR literature had 
hardly examined how and why relative rank and capability affect international behavior. 
Considering the aim of this research to understand the middlepowermanship, this 
research focuses on this behavioral approach as the basis of analysis.   
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Chapter 4                                            
“Middle Power” and “Middlepowermanship” 
 
 
 This chapter suggests a modified theoretical framework to understand 
secondary powers‟ international leadership. As this research has revealed so far, both 
middle power studies and IR research projects assume international hierarchy and the 
concept of “middle power” is a part of such assumptions. However, the behavioral 
approach to middle power is different from other IR approaches because behavioral 
model in middle power studies attempted to explain the behavioral patterns of middle 
powers and the reasons behind those. Based on this fact, this research suggests a 
framework that modifies the behavioral approach in middle power studies. 
 This chapter starts with an examination of the general characteristics of each 
category‟s international behavior. As chapter 3 indicated, existing studies examining the 
behavioral patterns of each category of countries have certain limitations because 
classifications are based on national power, international institutions or recognitions are 
not always corresponding to the behavioral pattern. More specifically, “middle powers” 
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do not always adopt the same diplomatic patterns of “middlepowermanship.” 
Governments are always examining available options and “middle power diplomacy” is 
merely one such option. To understand secondary powers‟ active diplomacy and 
leadership in some cases, this decision making process considering these options has to 
be investigated. Chapter 4 theoretically examines the general factors affecting these 
decisions and link domestic policy making processes to behavioral patterns. 
 
1.  “The Scheme of Gradation” and “Possible Middle Powers” 
 As chapter 3 indicated, it is almost impossible to objectively categorize 
countries as great, middle, and small powers throughout issues and timespans. In 
addition, as this research examined in chapter 3, the relative positions of countries in 
international society are influential but not genuine factors in determining their 
international behavior. Also, defining these categories is not the main goal of this 
research.   
 David Mitrany divided international community into two classes: the great 
powers and the other powers, which can be called “small powers” in a broad sense. 
Based on the recognition that some of these “small powers” were becoming stronger, he 
proposed to recognize these emerging states through “scheme of gradation”
148
. 
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Applying this view, this research suggests a flexible categorization of international 
hierarchy.  
 As Figure 4 below shows, this research is setting the assumption that the 
hierarchy in international society is essentially a flexible gradation and not a clear cut 
grouping. This research applies a flexible categorization view depending on the issues 
and contexts because countries in the same category could conduct different 
international policies depending on the issues and contexts.  
 
Figure 4 “Possible Middle Powers” 
 
In the very narrow meaning employed in existing literature, hegemonic 
       “Possible Middle Powers” 
based on several factors such as 
national power, frequency of 
being selected as UNSC member,  
    “Small Powers” in narrow sense  









 “Great Powers” in narrow sense 
(such as, hegemony, super power, bipolar countries, UNSC: 8 states) 
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countries, super powers, bipolar countries, UNSC members, nuclear states in the NPT 
system, and G8 countries are most likely to be categorized as great powers in recent 
years and in various contexts. In this sense, the United States, Russia, United Kingdom, 
France, China, Japan, Canada, and Italy could be considered great powers. However, 
even these countries do not always share the same behavioral patterns. For example, the 
countries‟ policies for the Iraq War in 2003 were remarkably varied: the United States 
and United Kingdom sent troops to the war; in the contrast, China, France, Russia and 
Italy opposed it; Japan partly backed the war; Canada sent troops for reconstruction.  
 As for small powers, this research applies the narrow definition of small 
powers in IR as a basis and adjusts categorization flexibly depending on issues and 
contexts. As a basic categorization of small powers, the small power category consists 
of 125 countries which are micro states, failed states and LDCs. Also, countries which 
do not have any extensive international involvement can be categorized as small powers 
from the perspective of international behavior
149
. However, even those small powers in 
the narrow definition are varied in terms of their behavior. For example, the Netherlands 
is the sixth biggest donor of the ODA in 2007 although the Netherlands is considered to 
be a micro state. Also, some countries such as Israel, North Korea and Pakistan are 
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known for their military power and for receiving considerable attention from the world 
although they are listed as failed states
150
. 
 In this research, “possible middle powers” are not clearly great powers; 
however, they are still distinguishable from other smaller powers because of their basic 
capabilities and frequent active involvement in international relations. These “possible 
middle powers” are changeable and contextual depending on issues and times. These 
“possible middle powers” have capabilities and the potential to choose middle power 
leadership in certain issues and times. On this point, this research is different from 
existing literature, which simply assumes the diplomacy conducted by “middle powers” 
as “middle power diplomacy” or “middlepowermanship” This research focuses on the 
conditions and motivations for “possible middle powers” to choose middle power 
leadership in international relations.  
 To set the flexible category of “possible middle power,” this research take 
integrate three approaches in IR which are national power, international institutions, and 
recognition and perceptions into account. As indicators for national power, large data 
sets, such as the National Material Capabilities data issued by the Correlates of War 
projects at the University of Michigan, can be applied because this data set is widely 
gathered throughout 1816 to 2001 and it contains various indicators. The international 
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institutional approach provides clear distinction between great powers and others. The 
membership of the UNSC and the nuclear power in NPT system show that the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China have exclusive status. Also, the 
frequency of being elected as a non-permanent UNSC member represent recognition 
from others and institutional status. Only three countries, Japan, Brazil, and Argentina, 
have been elected more than eight times. Next to these three states, eight countries have 
been elected five times, 17 countries four times, and 18 countries three times.  
 
Table 6 Indicators for “Scheme of Gradation” 
Approach Indicators References in this research 
National 
Power 
 Military power 
 Population 
 Economic power 
 National Material 
Capabilities (v3.02) in 
Correlates of War Projects at 
University of Michigan 
International 
Institution 
 The frequency of being 
elected as UNSC member.
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 The Web page of UN 
Security Council. 




      
 
2.  “Middle Power” and Leadership 
 This research is trying to explain some intermediate countries‟ remarkably 
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(Source: author) 
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active involvement and leadership in some cases of international politics. In other words, 
to understand “middlepowermanship” is the main focus of this research. To unertanding 
middle power diplomacy starts the analysis with an examination of the overall 
characteristics of each category‟s international behavior. The basic assumption that 
relative capabilities and ranks of countries affect the overall patterns of international 
behavior is widely shared in IR. In general understanding, each category of countries 
has rough behavioral patterns, due to the capability, as Figure 5 below.  
 

















Less Likely to 
Compromise 
More Likely to 
Compromise 
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Great powers have large capabilities and middle and small powers have less capability 
than great powers. The bigger capability makes it possible for countries to act 
unilaterally and less likely to compromise with others because they do not always need 
other actors‟ agreements and support to achieve their goals in international relations. 
However, “large states, even hegemonic states, need institutions to legitimate their 
power, to deal with shared problems, and to spread the risks and burdens of leadership” 
in some cases
153
. Once powerful countries decide to take international leadership, they 
can take a wider scale and stronger leadership due to their capabilities.  
 On the contrary to these powerful countries, less powerful countries are more 
likely to join multilateral activities and compromise with other actors, otherwise, it 
would be more difficult to achieve their goals by themselves. Indeed, the traditional 
source of influence for intermediate countries has been positions and presence in 
international institutions and coalitions
154
. For small powers with very limited 
capabilities, it is more practical to be a follower to other countries leadership in many 
cases. If middle and small powers seek to show strong influence and leadership, they 
have to select, more deliberately than other countries, issues and timing which their 
limited diplomatic resource can accomplish. 
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  The theoretical characteristics of each category‟s style of leadership can be 
summarized as in Table 7 below. The vertical axis represents the tendency of becoming 
a leader or follower. The horizontal axis stands for the tendency to act through 
unilateralism or multilateralism. The area A represents a policy that unilaterally 
pursuing its own goal. For example, one country could invade others unilaterally or 
resist existing international systems. The area B stands for taking leadership in 
multilateral co-operations. Achieving a leadership through an alliance or constructing 
international co-operations are the examples of this policy. The area C means actively 
participating neither the international co-operations, systems, decision making. Simply 
staying away from international movement led by others in particular issues and also 
Neutralization and Non-alignment policies could be the examples. Lastly, supporting 
other actors‟ multilateral leadership is categorized into the area D. For instance, joining 
the multilateral alliance or co-operations means becoming a follower of that particular 








 Table 7 Leadership of Each Category 
 Unilateralism Multilateralism 
Leadership 
A: Available for Great Powers. 
 To pursue own diplomatic goal 
unilaterally. 
 
B: Available for Great and Middle 
powers. 
 To take leadership through or in 
making alliance, multilateral 
cooperation, and international 
organization. 
 To take leadership with other actors. 
Followership 
C: Available for Great, Middle, 
and Small powers. 
 Neutralization/Non-alignment 
 Not participate in international 
agreement/decision making. 
 Not participate international 
cooperative activities. 
D: Available for Great, Middle, and 
Small powers. 
 To become a member or supported 
of multilateral alliance or 
cooperation.   
 To follow other actors. 
 
 
Great powers have all four options because of their large capabilities. Great 
powers can take leadership roles and also support others‟ leadership as a one of the 
followers. Also, they can choose whether to act by themselves or to co-operate with 
other actors. Great powers could stay away from international movement led by others 
as well.   
 On the other hand, small powers, with their strictly limited capabilities, are not 
(Source: author) 
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always capable of taking leadership. They are more likely to be a follower as a member 
of multilateral activities. In these cases, small powers‟ policy options are in area D in 
the Table 7. In addition, area C includes some small countries‟ neutralization or 
non-alignment policy. Neutralization and non-alignment policy is one of the common 
strategies employed by newly independent states
155
. Non-alignment is “a means of 
establishing a diplomatic identity distinct from the great powers or other small states 
which have become subsumed in great power alliance network.”
156
 Neutralization is 
also one of the strategies for small powers to play international roles such as mediator, 
or international conference centers
157
. 
 Because middle powers have relatively larger capabilities than small powers, 
middle powers theoretically have more policy options than small powers. Middle 
powers could become followers in multilateral co-operations led by other actors (area D 
below). At the same time, a middle power could be a leading actor in some cases; 
however, because of their limited capabilities, they can hardly pursue their policy 
unilaterally. Thus, middle powers‟ possible policy options are areas B, C, and D.    
Focusing on leadership, the general characteristics and strategies of 
international leadership are different between great powers and other minor powers. 
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Leadership can be defined as “the power of one or a few individuals to induce a group 
to adopt a particular line of policy
158
”. Thus, leadership is not always backed up by the 
absolute power of the leading actors or countries. Many research projects provide close 
analyses on the concept of “leadership” in international regimes, hegemony and 
international negotiation. According to these research projects, there are three categories 




 Firstly, structural leadership based on material resources and positions 
empowered or authorized in formal and/or informal ways, such as prime ministers and 
superpowers
160
. Structural leadership is often coterminous with superpowers, great 
powers or hegemony in international relations studies because they can take advantage 
of structural power and/or their overwhelming capabilities to exercise leadership in 
international issues
161
. These structural leaders could obtain followers based on coercion 
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or threats using their strong power. However, their positions and preponderance of 
power are not always sufficient conditions for structural leadership, even though they 
are necessary sources of this leadership
162
. Therefore, structural leadership is available 
mainly for great powers; however, not all great powers can take structural leadership.   
 Secondly, entrepreneurial leadership rests on the basis of negotiation skill or 
“cognitive resources
163
”, such as technological innovation and knowledge, in the 
bargaining process. Unlike the structural leadership, the entrepreneurial leadership does 
not necessarily require structural power or authorized position. The role as an 
entrepreneurial leader, such as in the coordinating bargainers‟ behaviors in a mutually 
agreeable fashion, is based on persuasion rather than coercion or threats
164
. Because of 
these characteristics of entrepreneurial leadership, it is available for not only powerful 
countries but also less powerful countries. In addition to governments, international 
organizations and individuals, such as prime ministers or foreign ministers, can also 
play roles as entrepreneurial leaders
165
.  
 Thirdly, intellectual leadership involves offering fresh ideas, new perspectives 
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and creative ways of conceptualizing problems
166
. New perspectives or new concepts 
can be offered by various actors. Therefore, this meathods of leadership is also available 
not only to great powers but also other powers or other non-state actors, such as 
international organizations, non- governmental organizations and epistemic 
communities.  
 Therefore, not only great powers but also other powers can take some types of 
leadership in international relations under the certain conditions. Because of the 
limitations of national power, other powers‟ leadership is more likely to be 
entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership in some issues in which they accomplish 
negotiation skills, cognitive resources, or new ideas.  
In addition, as this research indicates above in Table 7, other powers usually 
achieve leadership in multilateral activities co-operating and compromising with other 
members. “Possible middle powers” need agreement and support from other 
international actors, such as countries and international organizations, to take 
international initiatives. Great powers with structural power and huge national power do 
not always need agreement and support from other countries. However, less powerful 
countries have to persuade others to give support and co-operate to exercise 
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international leadership because of their limited capabilities. This persuasion will partly 
determine if they can achieve international initiatives. 
 In sum, combining the examinations in this chapter, middle power diplomacy 
or middlepowermanship in this research theoretically has four main features. Firstly, 
middlepowermanship is to take leadership employing cooperation with other actors, 
including countries, international organizations and international institutions rather than 
its own national power. Secondly, middle power leadership tends to be entrepreneurial 
or intellectual leadership, which does not always require massive national power and 
resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic option is basically available to very wide range 
of countries, classified as “possible middle powers” in this research, as one of the policy 
options. Fourth, the country applying middle power diplomacy does not always describe 
itself as “middle power”; in addition, the country calling itself “middle power” is not 
always conducting middle power diplomacy. The political rhetoric “middle power” and 
middle power diplomacy is not always inter-related. Lastly, only under certain 
conditions, this policy is chosen and successfully practiced. 
 
3.  Agenda Setting Process Choosing “Middlepowermanship”  
 These theoretical examinations above illustrate the general contours of the 
international leadership taken by intermediate powers. The next question involves how 
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they choose to take leadership policy and successfully achieve it. “Possible middle 
powers” do not always attempt to take leadership. Decision-makers in each country 
always examine available options at the time and the leadership policy of “middle 
power diplomacy” is merely one such option for them. To understand why 
middlepowermanship is chosen in certain cases, the decision making process 
eliminating other options has to be investigated. To examine how the middle power 
diplomacy option was organized into practice while other options were organized out 
will build the linkage between the behavioral patterns and domestic policy making 
process for those international policies. As Steven Livingston wrote, domestic agenda 
politics is “the intermediate” between “the actual substantive focus of international 
behavior and foreign policies
167
. To understand the decision making process choosing 
middlepowemanship for international policies will solve the circular argument problem 
in the existing behavioral approach in middle power studies.  
 This research is applying John Kingdon‟s the so-called “policy windows 
model” to understand the agenda-setting process because it is suitable to clarify the 
factors affecting the policy style selections among the one as a great power, middle 
power and small power
168
. Originally, his work presented a model focused on the Unites 
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States federal government‟s agenda-setting process for domestic public policies. Many 
studies applied his model to other policy areas and countries
169
.  
 In this view, new policy changes take place as a result of a “policy window” 
joining three separated streams; the problem stream, policy stream and political 
stream
170
. Policy windows are the precious opportunities to implement policy ideas and 
proposals. First, in “the problem stream,” participants with recognition that there are 
certain problems to handle is essential to start a new policy or change policy directions. 
Policy entrepreneurs, crisis, feedback about the operation of existing programs, and 
accumulation of knowledge can bring problems to officials‟ attention. Second, the 
“policy stream” is the development of policy proposals and the availability of 
alternatives and options for the recognized problem. Third, the “political stream” is 
political timing which is brought by elections, shift of national mood, change of 
administration, renewal of programs and crisis. When these separated streams are joined, 
the policy window is open. 
 Policy windows open only when the three streams join together and do not stay 
open for a long time. These windows close for four reasons. First, “participants may feel 
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they have addressed the problem through decision or enactment.” Second, “participants 
may fail to take action.” Third, the events, such as crises, that prompted the window to 




 As previous section indicated, middlepowermanship is one of the options for 
wide range of countries. One country could apply middlepowerapproach to commit one 
international issue and take leadership, at the same time, the same country could take a 
small power approach not to be involved to other issues. This Kingdom‟s framework is 
suitable to understand how a country selects such approaches to take leadership and 
exercise strong influence in international issues. 
The “policy stream,” which represents the availability and variety of policy 
options the particular country has for the issue, makes a vital difference in the 
approaches a country takes for an international leadership and strong influence in 
certain issues. The capability relating to the issue and available diplomatic resource 
result in the availability and variety of policy options in the policy stream. Even if 
participants of agenda-setting process recognized the problem, some countries still do 
not have enough capability or diplomatic resource to practice certain policy proposals to 
handle the problem and international influence through it. A country possessing huge 
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capability and resources available for the issues usually have more policy proposals 
than other countries without them. All three approaches, great, middle, and small power 
approaches, to the issue are available for a country with considerable capability and 
resources for that particular issue. Other countries with more limited capabilities and 
resources to put for the issue are carefully choosing the most effective and practicable 
approach which what they have can accomplish. As Barston indicated in his book, “the 
range of choice open to a government may in practice be severely limited.”
172
 
Therefore, “possible middle powers” will try to take leadership only in some selected 
issues because their diplomatic resources and issue areas are strictly limited depending 
on issue areas and time. .  
For example, in case of a large scale natural disaster in other countries or 
region, countries with certain resources have various options and approaches. As a great 
power leadership, a country can actively support the countries in question by sending 
rescue or reconstruction personnel‟s, goods or financial aid more than others and 
directly gain leadership in this issue. Instead of these direct and bilateral commitments, 
the middle power approach to lead multilateral support and share part of the physical 
task with others could be available, too. Also, they have options as a small power, which 
is not to be involved in this issue. On the other hand, for a country without such 
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personnel or affordable goods, sending a lot of personnel may not be a practicable 
option for its leadership and influence in this. However, even without sending personnel 
or goods, coordinating multilateral cooperation to support reconstruction after natural 
disasters might bring an influential diplomatic accomplishment to the country. One 
county might have to choose not to be involved in any international acts for that 
particular natural disaster because they cannot afford their resource at the time because 
of internal conflicts, slow development of its own economy or recession. These 
selection of approaches to international leadership and influence and availability of 
policy options for these are based on capability and diplomatic resource which are 
affordable for the issue at the time. They are the important factors influencing whether 
certain intermediate powers actively involved and take initiatives and how they do. 
Figure 6 below summarizes the modified three-stream framework based on 
Kingdon‟s policy windows framework to understand approach selections. In general, 
policy changes or new policies take place as a result of the three separated streams 











One of these three streams, the “policy stream” typically affects on the decision 
of the approaches a country takes for an international leadership and influence in that 
issue in the agenda-setting process. Even if participants of agenda-setting process 
recognized the problem aim to take international leadership role at the right domestic 
political timing, some countries still do have limitation on available capabilities and 
policy resources. The government is selecting approaches and policies to implement to 
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(Source: author based on Kingdom‟s 
Policy Windows framework) 
104 
handle the problem and obtain the international influence in accordance with the 
limitation they have.  
The capability relating to the issue and available diplomatic resource at the 
time determine the availability and variety of approaches and policy options. When the 
government recognized the issue at the right political timing, if a country has enough 
resources and capability available for the taking initiative in an international issue at the 
time, it would usually have all three approaches, great, middle, and small power 
approaches and choose the most effective one from three. A country with more limited 
capabilities and resources for the issue being discussed would carefully choose the most 
effective and practicable approach from middle power approach and small power 
approach. Shortage of necessary resource or too small capability to commit international 
issues would lead the country to take small power approach.  
In the implementation of the policy decision, especially secondary powers with 
limited capability need agreement and support from other actors. As explained in Figure 
5 in page 88, intermediate powers a have greater tendencies to act in multilateral 
co-operation. Especially for successful leadership or influencing the world, reliable 
multilateral support is necessary for possible middle powers.  
As Figure7 shows below, there are two levels of conditions for possible middle 
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powers to take international leadership and show strong influence through 
middlepowermanship. The first domestic conditions can be explained using Kingdon‟s 
policy window theory. Possible middle powers will try to take leadership only in the 
issues for which they can find practicable policy proposals with their limited 
capabilities and resources. Only in such areas can the three streams for agenda-setting 
join and open the policy window.  
  
Figure 7 Two Levels of International Leadership Policy Conditions  
 
 
4.  Case Selections for Case Studies 
 This research conducts case study that apply the modified framework to 
understand the factors lead a “possible middle power” to take middlepowemanship. The 
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and the policy decisions process choosing middle power approach to particular issues. 
The case study is conducted on Japanese diplomacy on advocating the idea of human 
security and exporting the Japanese interpretation on the concept.  
 Japan is one of the two leading countries that advocated the concept of “human 
security” in the late 1990s and 2000s. Japan and Canada accepted the new concept of 
“human security” even before the definition and understandings of the concept were 
widely accepted in the world. Their policies promoting and practicing the idea gave 
momentum to the idea of “human security” to widely spread in international relations. 
The Japanese government‟s support of the Commission of Human Security promoted 
understanding of the concept and established the Trast Fundation of Human Security in 
the United Nations and the Friends of Human Security Network. Also, the other 
committee to define the concept, the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty (ICISS) was hosted by the Canadian government and leadership in the 
Ottawa Process and the Human Security Network were started by the government of 
Canada.  
 These international leaderships advocating human security are typical examples 
of entrepreneurial leadership in world politics. Human security was a new concept in 
world in the 1990s. Japanese leadership advocating this new concept through its  
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international policies.  
 In addition, there are three methodological reasons underlying this case 
selection. The first objective is to show that the framework which this research 
suggested effectively help to understand actual policies in case study.  
Secondly, Japan is a good example to demonstrate the validity of the flexible 
categorization of the “possible middle power” framework. The second case study on 
Japanese “middlepowermanship” will be the “crucial case study” to show flexibility of 
categorization.
173
 Judging from total national power, Japan is usually assumed to be a 
“great power” in most of the research classifying countries. However, with the lack of 
the military combat power for international issues, it has limitations in policy options in 
certain areas. Thus, Japan cannot act as a “great power” in all international issues 
required military contribution. Thus, it applies “middlepowermanship” as one of its 
diplomatic strategies on case by case basis. The Japanese government policy for 
advocating the idea of human security policies is an example of such a strategy. The 
Japanese case effectively demonstrates that international behavior is not entirely 
determined by the total national power of a country, as well as how a particular country 
selects middle power approach to international leadership and influence.  
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 As the third aim of this case selection, the case study of Japanese diplomacy 
will provide a new perspective as a study of middle power diplomacy. Until the present 
day, only a few researchers such as Robert Cox and Yoshihide Soeya have mentioned 
some Japanese international policies as “middlepowermanship”. This research will be a 
novel contribution to middle power studies and Japanese studies by applying the 
concept of “middle power” to Japan. 
 This research has some limitation on its argument due to the limited number of 
case studies. Japan is a good example to show the flexibility of the distinction between 
middle and great powers. However, to examine the flexible division between small 
powers and middle powers other examples will be necessary.  
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Chapter 5                                     
Japanese Diplomacy for “Human Security” 
 
 
 Japan is known as one of the major contributors to the concept of human 
security and for its leadership in many issues relating to human security. The idea of 
human security was a new and popular concept in the late 1990s. It is suitable for 
entrepreneurial and intellectual leadership, which does not always require huge 
capability or structural power. The Japanese government took initiative in some issues 
relating to human security. This chapter examines three streams affected the Japanese 
government‟s decision to choose middlepowermanship approach for human security 
policies.  
 
1. Japan and Middle Power Diplomacy for “Human Security”  
1.1 The Concept of Human Security 
 The basis of the concept of “human security” was introduced into the world 
politics by the 1994 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human 
Development Report. This Report advocated broadening the concept of security from 
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the traditional framework of national security: “for too long, security most has been 
equated with the threats to a country‟s border….For most people today, a feeling of 
insecurity arises more from worries about daily life than from the dread of a cataclysmic 
world event.
174
” In this understanding of security, security is threatened not only by 
international wars and conflicts, but also the lack of appropriate infrastructure, natural 
disasters and even nonfunctioning government on individual level. The report listed 
seven categories of human security: economic, food, environmental, personal, 
community, and political security.
175
 In the beginning, when the report presented the 
idea, human security was a broad and vague concept advocating the new idea of 
“security of each human‟s life.”  
This vagueness and expansiveness can be both the problems and advantages of 
the concept of human security. As for the problematic aspect, Roland Paris threw doubts 
on the effectiveness of a too-broad definition of human security: “if human security 
means all these things, what isn‟t it?
176
” He also pointed out that “if human security 
means anything, then it effectively means nothing.
177
” However, at the same time, the 
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ambiguity also worked as an advantage that the concept is flexibly adjustable to various 
contexts. As Paris indicated, “human security is powerful precisely because it lacks 
precision and thereby encompasses the diverse perspective and objectives of all the 
members of the coalition.
178
” The wide range of meaning of human security allows 
entrepreneurial actors to customize the idea according to the needs and interests of 
actors involved in each case
179
.  
    Discussion came after the UNDP report‟s presentation of the concept narrowed 
down the idea of human security into two approaches which are “freedom from fear” 
and “freedom from want.” The first approach, “freedom from fear” is a narrower 
interpretation than “freedom from want.” The first approach puts emphasis on 
protecting people from physical violence and the conservation of basic human rights. 
The other approach, “freedom from want” covers much more than “freedom from fear”. 
It has a much broader range to apply policies for the satisfaction of basic human needs 
for well-being and sustainable human development.  
 There had been a long discussion over these interpretations among 
governments, scholars and international organizations. Especially in the 1990s and early 
2000s, countries supporting different interpretation were conducting strikingly different 
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policies separately. For example, Canada, Australia, and Norway supported the 
“freedom from fear” approach and took initiatives to build the international system to 
enforce human security on “freedom from fear” such as the Ottawa Conventions on 
Antipersonnel Land mines, the Rome Treaty establishing the International Criminal 
Court, International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and the Human 
Security Network. Connersely, the Japanese government supported “freedom from 
want” and established the Trust Foundation for Human Security, the Commission on 
Human Security, and the Friends of Human Security Network.  
In academia, IR scholars such as Krause put emphasis on “basic security 
needs” and supported the idea of “freedom from fear.”
 180
 On the other hand, Gary 
King and Christoppher J.L. Murray‟s research on human security pays considerable 
attention to human well-being.
181
 However, because it is apparent that both physical 
protection and economical development are essential for a truly secure world for people, 
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1.2 Japanese Policies for Human Security 
 The Japanese government put weight on economic aspects human security 
“freedom from want.” Japan applies the definition of the World Commission on Human 
Security: “creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural 




 The Japanese government listed four main achievements in promoting and 
practicing the idea of human security on a global basis along with its understanding of 
human security on the web site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
184
. Firstly, Japan 
provided about three hundred million dollars to establish The Trust Found for Human 
Security in the United Nations, which is one of the biggest foundations in the United 
Nations since 1999
185
. According to the speech given by Japanese Prime Minister 
Obuchi announcing the establishment of the foundation, the primary purpose of this 
foundation is “to construct „century of peace and prosperity built on human security‟ in 
Asia
186
.” The Trust Fund for Human Security supported 179 projects until 2008 
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“directed towards developmental concerns including key thematic areas such as health, 
education, agriculture and small scale infrastructure development,” in over 60 
countries. 
187
   
Secondly, the Japanese government supported and hosted the Commission of 
Human Security in 2001 in response to the UN Secretary-General‟s call at the 2000 
Millennium Summit for a world “free of want” and “free of fear” in January 2001.
188
. 
Prime Minister Mori proposed to set up an international committee in his speech at the 
Millenium Sumitt:    
Japan also intends to establish an international committee on 
human security, with the participation of world renowned opinion 




This commission had Professor Amartya Sen and Mrs. Sadako Ogata as co-chairs and 
ten other major members The three major goals of the committee were anounced as 
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follows: 
1. to promote public understanding, engagement and support   
of human security and its underlying imperatives;  
2. to develop the concept of human security as an operational 
tool for policy formulation and implementation; and  
3. to propose a concrete program of action to address critical 
and pervasive threats to human security
190
.  
The Japanese government financially and operationally supported this committee  
because the government was started to pursue policies defining and advocating the idea 
of human security itself as well as accumulating operations along the idea
191
. This 
commission presented its report to Secretary-General of the United Nations Kofi Annan 
on 1st May 2003.  
 Thirdly, the ODA and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) projects 
are planned in accordance with the idea of human security.
 192
 Japan's ODA Charter 
provides the concept of human security as a key perspective.   
   
 (2) Perspective of "Human Security" 
In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, 
disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the 
global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the 
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perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. 
Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity 
of local communities through human resource development. To 
ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the 
conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan 





Lastly, the Japanese government established and supported the “Friends of 
Human Security” network from 2006. According to the chair‟s summary at the first 
meeting, “the purpose of the meeting was to provide an informal forum for member 
states as well as relevant international organizations to discuss the concept of human 
security from different angles in order to seek a common understanding of human 
security and explore collaborative efforts for mainstreaming it in United Nations 
activities.
194
” The Friends of Human Security network is essentially based on the 
definition of human security provided by the Commission of Human Security and 
focuses on Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), humanitarian assistance, climate 
change, peace-building, and the protection of children
195
. Representatives from 
Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, 
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Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Mongolia, Norway, the Republic of 
Korea, Slovenia, South Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, and Viet Nam attended 
the first meeting. Japan sent diplomats as chairs to all three meetings until now.
196
   
 These active Japanese policies under the name of human security have the 
following three features. Firstly, the government was seeking to take leadership and 
achieve strong influence in these policies. The Human Security foundation is a trust 
foundation in the United Nations; however, the Japanese government has intentions to 
control the usage of the funding within the foundation
197
. Hence, the foundation is not 
truly independent. In addition, Japan sent diplomats as chairs to all three meetings of the 
Friends of Human Security Network as the chair
198
. Secondly, the government 
consistently put emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and 
consistently avoided applying the phrase of “freedom from fear”. In fact, even when 
Japan signed the Ottawa Treaty which is considered to be a typical example of the case 
of “freedom from fear”, the Japanese government announced it as the movement to 
“protect the weak”, not to “protect the weak from fear,” in its official speech
199
. Thirdly, 
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Japanese human security policy has been shaped more by accumulating programs, 
mainly through ODA focusing on economic development and community 





1.3 Options for Japanese Diplomacy 
Japan is not promoting itself as a “middle power” by employing the political 
term of “middle power.” The exact term of “middle power” was not found in official 
speeches delivered by Japanese Prime Ministers or Minister of Foreign Policy in the 
contexts of human security. However, as an option for diplomatic strategies, middle 
power diplomacy has been one of the options for Japan.  
 Japan had all three approaches of policies as a small power, a middle power 
and a great power after the Second World War. Right after the Second World War, the 
Japanese government‟s mainstream policy options were typically those for “small 
powers” which means focusing on domestic issues and not interested in the active 
involvement in international issues. Right after the Second World War, control and 
political influence of the General Headquarters of the Allied Forces strictly limited 
Japan‟s autonomy. In this situation, it had neither will nor enough capability to commit 
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international issues and also it was relying its national security on others, typically the 
U.S. at the time.  
 After regaining the sovereignty in 1952, the government still concentrated on 
its own domestic issues, which was mainly reconstruction and economic development, 
and heavily relied on the U.S for its national security. This policy direction was 
reflected in “Yoshida Doctrine” established by the government led by the 48
th
 Prime 
Minister Shigeru Yoshida from 1946 to 1954.
201
 Yoshida prioritized economic 
reconstruction and development over buildup of Japan‟s defense capability. He 
facilitated economic growth of Japan by minimizing the expense to maintain military 
force. From the 1950s, Japanese national security has been heavily relying on the U.S. 
This security situation and the East-West division in the Cold War did not leave much 
room for Japan to other multilateral international activities apart from the U.S. or strong 
bilateral relationship with other countries other than the U.S.
202
. Throughout the Cold 
War, this policy direction as a small power prevailed as the major policy option for 
Japan. 
 After Japanese economy rapidly grew in the 1960s and 1970s, the policy 
options available to Japan became varied from the 1980s. Japan became a country with 
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second biggest economy in the world in 1968 and a member of G8, which started as G6 
with six members in 1975, and Japanese assessed financial contribution to the U.N 
sharply increased. Reflecting the increasing Japan‟s economic power, the U.S started to 
demand “burden sharing” for Japan‟s national defense and international affairs. Based 
on the economic growth of Japan and the recognition of the declining U.S. hegemony, 
Japanese people‟s self image of Japan in the world and international policy options were 
changing in the 1980s.  
 Firstly, the previous major policy direction as a small power was not the sole 
option to Japan any more. Autonomy came to the new discussion in the 1980s. Powerful 
advocates of “autonomous defense,” such as the 71
st
 PM Nakasone Yasuhiro, inspired a 
lot of people in Japan, although the U.S.-Japan alliance policy had to remain to be the 
main pillar of defense policy during the Cold War in his opinion
203
. The changes in the 
international environment also raised doubts and concerns on over the national defense 
of Japan relying on the U.S. Firstly, the relative decline of U.S. global power and 
presence in Northeast Asia raised question about the U. S‟s capability to defend Japan. 
Secondly, the economic frictions between Japan and the U.S. and the criticism of 
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Japan‟s “free or cheap ride” on the U. S. protection appeared with intensity
204
.  
 Secondly, Japan was gaining policy options as a great power based on its 
economic power. In economy relating issues, the Japanese government began to show 
remarkable international contributions. For example, financial contribution to the U.N. 
and ODA rapidly increased. The world started to recognize Japan‟s power in various 
ways, such as membership in the G8 and non-permanent seat in the Security Council in 
the U.N.
205
 In this situation, some people, such as Ikutaro Shimizu, expand their 
thought beyond the “autonomy.”
206
 They insisted to maintain an equal security 
partnership with the U.S. and pursue policies for Japan‟s own interests even unilaterally 
because they considered “Japan‟s subordinate position to the U. S. [was] an affront to 
Japan‟s prestige.
207
” The discussion over revising the U. S.-Japan security treaty and the 
more active international roles of Self Defense Force was started among advocators who 
were insisting that “appropriate” military power was necessary for a great power to 
pursue policies and keep the prestige and national pride.  
 Thirdly, the idea of middle power diplomacy through issue limited international 
contribution was also found in Japanese policies from the 1980s. This momentum 
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reflected Japan‟s own development, as well as criticisms of Japan‟s “free or cheap ride” 
because Japan appeared no longer a weak or small country that requires U.S.‟s and 
international aid or protection
208
. The government sought its international roles mainly 
in the economic issues. For example, the 78
th
 PM Kiichi Miyazawa insisted that Japan 
had to take active international roles in the world in economic issues not the ones in 
military area.
209
 In addition, the Japanese government has been putting emphasis on 
international regimes and organizations, especially the UN.  
 After the Cold War, new policy options and views on Japanese policies 
emerged in accordance with the change of international situations. Japan was seeking 
new diplomatic strategies to effectively commit the world affairs that suitable for the 
new international situation after the Cold War. From the late 1990s, discussion on 
middle power diplomacy and great power diplomacy widely took place on in Japan. The 
policy direction as a small power lost momentum in Japan because of the economic 
development and lost of the major supporter of such policies, such as Social Party
210
.   
 In the contexts of promoting middle power diplomacy, diplomatic strategies 
based on multilateral activities including PKOs, maximizing Japanese “soft power,” and 
multilateral cooperation with other countries and international organization including 
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the U.N. was emphasized
211
. Firstly, participation in the U.N. peace-keeping operations 
gathered attention from politicians and officials especially after the Cold War. Japan had 
a frustrating experience being criticized for not effectively contributing to the ally in the 
Gulf War in 1991despite its 14 billion dollars financial contribution. This incident made 
the government seek more effective policies to commit the world affairs and fairly 
recognized by those in the world
212
. Not only financial contributions but also taking 
roles in security issues were considered to be necessary after the traumatic experience in 
the Gulf War. After the fierce discussion, the International Peace Cooperation Law in 
1992 enabled the Japanese government to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN 
peace-keeping operations for the first time. 
 Also, in the context of peace-keeping operations, Canadian diplomacy along 
with the term of “middle power” received attention in Japan in the 1990s. As a “novice” 
of peace-keeping operations, Japanese officials and politicians drew upon Canadian 
experience. The number of research projects on Canada‟s participation to peace-keeping 
operations and “middle power diplomacy” conducted by the government and academia 
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was increased in the 1990s.  
 Secondly, the Japanese government recognized this “soft power” and started to 
develop this strength through the overseas public relations and cultural exchange 
policies because Japanese pop culture, such as animations, comic books, and fashion, 
were becoming popular in the world. The phrase of “soft power” appeared in the 
Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 for the first time in the official policy statement as follows,  
 
[T]here has been a growing recognition in recent years that soft power, 
or the ability to attract another country through promoting the 
attraction of traditional values or culture, can improve the country‟s 
image, enhance its diplomatic resources and lead to national security 
in a broader sense. Moreover, international cultural exchange can 
revitalize Japanese society by bringing in both intellect and talent 





The Diplomatic Bluebook 2004 also expected promoting policy using traditional culture 
and pop culture to improve images and “lead to the revitalization of Japan‟s economy, 
society and culture.
214
” The idea of soft power became popular among policy 
practitioners and academics in Japan in the 1990s. In many contexts, softer power 
represents overall positive images on Japan and not strictly limited to cultural aspects.  
For example, a diplomat Zyuzo Yabunaka advocated “middle size and high quality 
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nation (Tyukibo kou-hinshitu Kokka)” as an international strategy to construct positive 
image of Japan in the world
215
. 
 On the other hand, the argument advocating Japanese international policies as a 
great power was also growing. It was supported by uncertainties of security in Asia and 
growing nationalism from the 1990s in Japan. Security issues relating to North Korea 
have been strongly affecting to Japan‟s attitude and view to national security from the 
1990s.  North Korea appeared as dangerous and obvious security threat to Japan both 
in national and individual level. In 1993, North Korea suddenly withdrew from the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and started to declare it a nuclear armed state. Its test 
of the missile deployment in 1998 demonstrated the possibility of attack by North Korea. 
In 2002, the North Korean government admitted that North Korean agents kidnapped 
Japanese citizens. These security threats accelerated the view that supported the 
maintenance of stronger defensive power and, more importantly, Japanese general 
public was overcoming its “military allergy” and started to openly discuss a military 
threat for the first time after the War because of these visible security threads
216
. 
 The rise of China had significant impact on the Japanese international views 
and policy options. The Chinese economy remarkably grew in the 1990s and China 
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developed its military power. This rapid develop of Chinese economic and military 
power became the focus of the U.S.‟s, as well as Japanese, attention as “China 
threat.”
217
 The “China threat” argument contained diverse view of China from the point 
that an increasingly powerful China was changing the regional power balance and 
destabilizing Asian security in the near future to the point that China could be a 
superpower based on its population, technology and military power in the future
218
.  
 In Japan, although China was recognized as one of the most important 
economic partner, rising China also provoked a sense of rivalry and insecurity
219
. From 
1992, modernization and expansion of military power of China has been receiving 
considerable and increasing attention in the Annual White Paper of Defense of each 
year
220
. The sense of rivalry revived and strengthened Nationalism in Japan in the1990s 
and 2000s led by advocators, who were influential particularly on public, such as 
politician Shintaro Ishihara, academics Sukumu Nishibe and Terumasa Nakahashi. This 
nationalism made the historical issues between Japan, China, and Korea more complex 
and difficult for the government to handle. For example, the 87
th
 PM Koizumi was 
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harshly criticized for officially visiting the Yasukuni Shine by China and Korea and led 
to worsened diplomatic relations between them
221
. Also, the more Chinese leaders and 
citizens criticized these pilgrimages, the more the Japanese general public indignant at 
Chinese interference in domestic affairs
222
. On the other hand, when he did not visit it, 
he was also criticized by nationalist in Japan in 2005
223
.  
 By foreign policy officials and practitioners in Japan, the raise of China was 
accepted with more equanimity than the public. Most of the officials of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs seemed to view calmly the quick expand of Chinese economic power 
and the relative decline of Japan‟s position. They were seeking effective policies in such 
environment
224
. For example, a Japanese diplomat Hitoshi Tanaka admitted that the 
Japanese presence in the world was relatively declining because of the growing Chinese 
presence. He also explained that relatively weakening presence in Asia does not always 
harm the national interest if the government handles the situation collect
225
.  
 Recently, the world wide discussion on U.N. Security Council reform based on 
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provoked Japanese international position especially in the U.N in 2004
226
. Japan was 
promoting itself as the prime candidate for the additional permanent member of the 
council. However, during this period of time, the main focus of the domestic interest 
was on how Japan should be treated and recognized, but not exactly on the relative 
position of Japan itself. After the certain period of time, the discussion on the Japan‟s 
relative position in the world itself slowed down.  
 Figure 8 below summarizes the three international policy directions to Japan 
sorted along with two axes. The longitudinal axe is a measure of the emphasis on 
bilateral relationship with the U.S. The other axe represents willingness and interest on 
involvement to international issues.  
The policy directions as a great power require more involvement to 
international issues including the international deployment of Self Defense Force. The 
strong economic power of Japan is emphasized in this context. In this view, Japan has to 
keep distant from the U.S. to maintain its autonomy, international prestige and national 
pride. As a middle power, Japan takes certain international roles in international issues, 
such as ad hoc participation in PKOs under the U.N. and economic contribution to the 
world issues. Although the security cooperation with the U.S. is still one of the pillars of 
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the national defense, Japan acts in multilateral cooperation with others at the same time. 
The last policy direction as a small power put strong emphasis on the security treaty 
with the U.S. and does not show the enthusiasm to be involved in international issues.  
 
Figure 8 Three International Policy Directions for Japan  
 
  
As examined above, after the Second World War, Japan used to have small 
power policies, which was to concentrate on the economic development leaning on the 
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a middle power, which was selective international activism through multilateralism and 
the international organizations, and those as a great power, which was seeking 
autonomy and pursuing international policies for Japan‟s own interests even unilaterally. 
These three overall policy directions were available and the government selected from 
them on case by case basis depending on the available resource and constraints at the 
time. In the particular policies relating to human security, Japan decided to take middle 
power approach as this research examined in this chapter. The following part clarifies 
these available resource and constraints affected this policy decision using the 
framework presented in the previous chapter. 
 
2. Agenda-Setting Process for Middle Power Diplomacy 
Japan put emphasis on the economic and developmental aspects of human 
security and took initiative in four international projects: establishing The Trust Found 
for Human Security in the United Nations, supporting the Commission for Human 
Security, Official Developmental Aid projects in accordance with the idea, and 
established and supporting the “Friends of Human Security” network. This section 
examines three streams affecting the Japanese government‟s decision to promote and 
practice the concept of human security in its middlepowermanship initiatives. In the 
131 
agenda setting process, the participants chose the ways and policies carefully based on 
the strength and constraints for these human security relating policies they had at the 
time.  
2.1 Problem Stream  
 Two influential international problems in the 1990s attracted Japanese 
politicians‟ and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials‟ attention and created the 
“problem stream”. The first one is the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the other is the 
Ottawa Process in1997.  
The Asian Financial Crisis is “the financial crisis that erupted in Asia in 
mid-1997 [which] led to sharp declines in the currencies, stock markets, and other asset 
prices of a number of Asian countries” such as Thailand, South Korea, Indonesia, 
Malaysia and the Philippines
227
. International organizations, such as the IMF and World 
Bank, along with many countries other committed to the affected countries 117.9 billion 
US dollars in 1997 and 1998
228
. However, as a result of this financial crisis, the real 
growth of GDP in Thailand was estimated to be -7 to -8, Indonesia‟s to be -16, and 
Korea‟s to be – 7
229
. The Japanese government contributed 44 billion dollars to support 
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countries in question from July 1997 to November 1998.  
The Asian Financial Crisis was one of the major concerns of the Government 
after 1997 because the Japanese industry and the investment were closely 
interconnected in the Asian economy. In PM Obuchi‟s speeches at the time, the Asian 
Financial Crisis and the domestic recession were the most frequently mentioned 
topics
230
. Especially in the times of the long recession from 1995 in Japan, the crisis and 
the downward speed of the Asian economy was the significant concern.  
As Dan Wood and Jeffery Peake‟s research showed, policy makers‟ attention 
toward problems tends to stay long and consistent in agenda setting for foreign policy 
until certain measures would be done.
231
 In particular, the influence of prominent 
incidents in the world, such as the Asian Financial Crisis, is likely to remain long and 
strong in foreign policy making because governments have to prevent the next 
occurrence as well as handle the impact of such impressive incidents in medium– and 
long-term policies. In fact, even 12 years after the crisis, current Japanese PM Aso Taro 
still mentioned Japanese ongoing policies dealing with the impact of economic and 
financial crisis in Asia in his speech
232
. The external evaluation report on the ODA and 
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Japanese response to the Asian financial crisis issued in March 2002 assumed similar 




 Other than the Asian financial crisis, the Ottawa Process drew Japanese 
attention to the idea of human security. In December 1997, 133 countries, including 
Japan, signed the Ottawa Treaty, formally the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, 
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their 
Destruction
234
. Characteristically, the Ottawa Process had a strict time framework and a 
clear goal shared by the participating countries, which were called “like-minded 
countries.”
235
 Cooperating non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as the 
International Red Cross and International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL) 
network, had a great role in advocating the humanitarian aspect of the landmine issue 
through their campaigns. Portraying civilian victims, especially women and children, in 
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the campaign transformed the landmine issue from an arms control issue to a 
humanitarian issue
236
. Because the idea of protecting civilians shared the basis with the 
idea of “human security”, the Ottawa Process is often connected to it. The remarkable 
movement to ban anti-personnel landmines around the world at the time made Japanese 
politicians and officals to realize the power and possibility of approaching security 
issues from humanitarian viewpoints including the idea of “human security”
237
.  
 In the short time during the time set for the Ottawa Process, the Japanese 
government had to decide on its position and whether sign the Ottawa Treaty or not. 
This caused active discussions on landmines and the humanitarian issues in Japan. Anti 
personnel land mines are considered to be imperative to defend Japan‟s coast-line by the 
Japan Defense Agency
238
. Politicians in the parliament, Foreign Ministry officials and 
the Hashimoto cabinet at the time were slowly convinced to ban anti personnel land 
mines by the advocacy of the humanitarian viewpoint on the land mine issue
239
. The 
accession of the new foreign minister Keizo Obuchi and his support for the growing 
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public voices marked a turning point and accelerated the momentum to sign the treaty. 
He stated, “Japan is helping with the clearance of land mines in Cambodia. For Japan 
not to recognize the [Ottawa] treaty does not make sense to me….We must observe the 
trends of the world and do the things that we have to do.”
240
  
 Also, Japan witnessed Canada‟s remarkable leadership through the Ottawa 
Process. During and after the Ottawa Process, the argument claiming the efficiency of 
the “Canadian way” for Japan quickly grew in Japan. Also, one of the key leading 
people in the Ottawa Process, Lloyd Axworthy, met Obuchi for the first time during the 
1996 Summit
241
. Axworthy introduced the idea of human security to Obuchi at this time 
and they kept exchanging opinions after that meeting.   
 
2.2 Political Stream and Policy Entrepreneurs 
 For the “political stream,” Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and his policy 
advisors had vital roles.
242
. PM Obuchi‟s personality and his beliefs are considered to 
have had important influence towards accepting the idea of middle power and applying 
policies in accordance with the idea. Also, his policy advisors played a role as policy 
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entrepreneurs.  
Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama is the prime minister presented to 
international society that the Japanese Government was supporting the concept of 
human security as a policy option
243
. After the Murayama government the idea of 
human security did not receive fair attention during the time of PM Hashimoto‟s 
government
244
. PM Obuchi‟s policy advisors brought his attention to the issues of 
human security and resulted in Japan‟s active international policies applying the idea of 
human security during and after the Obuchi government.  
PM Tomiichi Murayama is thought to be the first policy-maker who had 
mentioned the concept of human security in an international and official scene.
245
 He 
applied the idea of human security in his address to the World Summit for Social 
Development in March 1995. In the following speech at the summit, he described an 
ideal society as a society with opportunities for self-realization for each individual.
246
 
In addition, he insisted that social development support should be people-centered. 
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As head of the Japanese Government, I seek the creation of a 
"human-centered society," a vision of Japan in which each 
individual citizen is treated equally, endowed with opportunity to 
fully develop his or her potential, and enabled to utilize fully his or 
her capacity through employment and participation in society. I 
consider that such political beliefs of mine are in line with the 




Although he did not mention this idea using the exact term “human security” at the time, 
his interpretation of "human-centered society" is very similar to “freedom from want.” 
After the 1995 World Summit, he explained in the Standing Committee on Budget in 
1996 that he avoided employing the exact term “human security” because the idea was 
not established and shared in the world yet
248
.  
The exact term of “human security” was employed officially in the speech of 
Prime Minister Murayama at the UN General Assembly on 22
nd
 October in 1995. He 
illustrated human security as a concept for respect of the human rights of each person.
249
 
In addition, he stated that the Japanese government will support this idea and 
international co-operation based on this idea.   
 
A new concept of „human security,‟ in addition of national security, 
has emerged as a major challenge for the United Nations. This concept, 
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which embraces respect for the human rights of every citizen on this 
earth and protection of each of us from poverty, disease, ignorance, 





The basis of the idea of human security suited PM Murayama‟s general policy 
direction and his beliefs. He had already paid attention to individuals‟ security and 
development from the beginning of his term as a prime minister in the contexts of 
domestic policy. PM Murayama‟s general-policy speech delivered in July 4
th
 in 1994 
stated that constructing “human centered-society” was one of his goals as a Prime 
Minister
251
. PM Murayama and other politicians already discussed the idea of human 
security several times in the House of Representatives and special committees
252
. Also, 
because the idea of “people-centered social development” was mentioned in the context 
of ODA in Diplomatic Blue issued in 1996, the rough idea for economic and social 




The very definition of development now includes not only 
"economic development" (often the subject of conferences 
sponsored by the U.N. but also sustainable development, which 
makes much of environmental conservation and "people-centered 
development" that focuses on human and social advancement. 
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 http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/1996/index.html (accessed on June 25, 2009) 
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Therefore, the similar idea of human security had been receiving certain 
attention from politicians and officers of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the time of 
PM Murayama. However, political support and specific policy proposals were still 
limited because the idea of “human security” was just introduced to the world at the 
time and there was a lot of discussion among scholars and politicians. Therefore, even if 
the political stream could occur at this time, detailed policy proposals were not ready 
yet and there was no remarkable problem stream to encourage these movements.      
 Based on the rough idea of human security PM Murayama brought to the 
Japanese government, PM Keizo Obuchi applied the idea to the policies and made the 
political stream with his policy advisors. PM Obuchi‟s personality and his own belief, 
along with his policy advisors who played the role of “policy entrepreneurs,” brought 
the political stream.  
 Firstly, Keizo Obuchi as a politician had a characteristically strong interest in 
developing countries and supporting the weak. This attitude to the world was considered 
to be derived from his own nine-month backpacking experience in the world when he 
was 25 years old
254
. This rare back-ground is made Obichi have original opinions as a 
Japanese politician on developmental issues. Also, PM Obuchi explained that seeing 
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people‟s lives through this trip led him to the idea of human security.  
 
36 years ago, when I was just a student, I traveled around 
38countries in Asia, Middle East, Africa, Europe, North America, 
Central and south America as a “backpacker” which was very rare 
at the time. I think I learned the importance of ties between people 
and each individual through this travel and this experience 
eventually led me to the idea of “Human Security”
255
    
As he himself described in the speech above, his interest coincided with the idea of 
human security in terms of helping the weak and paying attention to individuals‟ 
security.  
Secondly, Obuchi was known as a good listener because he took policy 
advisors‟ and people‟s opinions and advice very seriously. These characteristics resulted 
in his policy advisors‟ entrepreneurship advocating the idea of human security. For 
taking specialists‟ and other politicians‟ opinion, Former PM Nakasone along with the  
mass media called PM Obuchi as “a vacuum tube.” This joke positively and negatively 
meant that he listens to others and “vacuums” the advice and opinion. At the same time 
he is also known for his habit of keeping close communication with people. He held 
remarkably frequent meetings with citizens and delivered messages to people. One of 
the most popular words in 1999 in Japan is the “Butchi-phone” (short form of “Obuchi 
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phone”) showed his habit of calling people, including scholars and citizens, very frankly, 
and was well known and appealed to people in Japan
256
.  
His advisory group had a strong influence on Obuchi‟s policy directions. They 
played the policy entrepreneurs-roles. When Obuchi was assigned as the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in 1997, the policy advisor group was organized. The major members 
were Tadashi Yamamoto from the Japan Center for International Exchange, Yoichi 
Funabashi and Akira Kozima from mass media, Makoto Iokibe and Akihiko Tanaka 
from academia, and Keizo Takemi a member of the House of Representatives. This 
advisory group affected Obuchi‟s policy directions by holding frequent meetings and 
close communication through phone calls during his time as a Minister of Foreign 
Minister and Prime Minister.  
In particular, Keizo Takemi, a member of the House of Representatives, was 
considered to bring the idea of human security to Obuchi. Takemi used to be a 
researcher in the Strategic Peace and International Affairs Research Institute in Tokai 
University. According to himself, Takemi encountered research on human security by 
Lincoln Chen and had been interested in the idea from the early stages
257
. He was 
selected as a member of the House of Representatives in 1995 and a member of the 
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advisory group for Obuchi. After a few years of service in the board, he was assigned as 
the parliamentary vice-minister of foreign affairs in the Obuchi government in July 
1998, which demonstrated Obuchi‟s trust in Takemi.  
 
2.3 Policy Streams 
 There were certain strengths and constraints of Japan in terms of policy options 
that affected selection of middle power approach for the Japan‟s leadership in human 
security issues. From the perspectives of the overall national power on Japan in the late 
1990s and 2000s, Japan was often assumed to be a great power and to take great power 
initiatives in the world. However, in the issues relating to human security, Japan took 
middlepowermanship and limited the approach and policies to “freedom from want” 
issues. As chapter 4 theoretically indicated, Japan had limited capabilities and policy 
resources for the human security relating issues at the time. The available resource and 
policy options for this issue based on strengths and constraints led Japan to take the 
middle power approach to international leadership.   
Japan has strong constraints on international activities because of its 
constitution and relationships with its neighboring counties. These restraints limited 
Japanese policy options to take leadership only on the interpretation of human security 
as “freedom from want.” This constraint even prevented Japan from officially working 
143 
with other countries and networks on the interpretation of human security as “freedom 
from fear.” 
Constraints: Use of Force 
 Japan has strict restraints in military activities in the world because the 
Japanese constitution rigidly limits the military's role to self-defense. The Japanese 
constitution has been thought to forbid “use of force” in Article 9.
258
  
   
  Chapter II Renunciation of War 
Article 9.Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on 
justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means 
of settling international disputes.  
 (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be 
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be 
recognized. 
 
 Especially among political parties, even among legal scholars, various debates 
surrounding this Article 9 and fierce arguments on the role of Self Defense Force are 
continuing in Japan. The interpretation of this part of the constitution is still varied; 
some people consider Japan should not have any military power, some insist the Self 
Defense Force should not participate in any activities outside of Japan, some agreed to 
send personnel only for peace-keeping operations or supporting reconstruction 
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operations, some believe that Japan need more military power for defense itself.  
 Because of various conflicting opinions within Japan, the Japanese government 
has to apply ad hoc law and rules for each case to send Self Defense Force personnel. In 
fact, the International Peace Cooperation Law in 1992 enabled the Japanese government 
to send Self-Defense Forces personnel to UN peace-keeping operations and it limited 
the activities strictly such as the electoral observation and humanitarian aid. The 
Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which established in October 2001 as one of 
Japan‟s measures in response to the 9/11 simultaneous terrorist attacks, allowed Japan to 
participate only replenishment activities for various countries‟ vessels carrying out 
Operation Enduring Freedom in the Indian Ocean. The Law Concerning the Special 
Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq in 2004 enabled the 
Japan to join reconstruction support only in noncombat area.  
 
Apprehensions for the Antipathy from Neighboring Countries 
 Second, because of the apprehensions that trust and concord especially with 
neighboring Asian countries could be endangered, Japan refrained from taking 
initiatives in human security policy applying the “freedom from fear.” The government 
took a cautious attitude to the “freedom from fear” to be a “non-threatening security 
145 
actor” in human security paradigm
259
. Japan has been very careful not to provoke any 
antipathy from neighboring countries over historical issues during World War II. The 
remaining suspicions feared militarization of Japan and occasional antipathy from Asian 
countries have been a concern among Japanese political leaders and diplomats for long 
time. For instance, the Japanese government did not officially participate in the Human 
Security Network‟s meeting, which supports “freedom from fear,” because of the 
concern of antipathy from neighboring countries among officials in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs
260
. Also, the government avoided applying the term “human security” in 
the contexts of sending Self Defense Force personnel to PKOs. 
   
ODA Policies 
 Other than these constraints, the Japanese government had several policies in 
progress and policy proposals accessible to connect to the idea of human security. These 
available policy options made the decision to take leadership employing the idea of 
human security possible for the government. In addition, Japan placed its human 
security policies as a part of the promotion of itself in the continuing discussion over 
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establishing new permanent members on the Security Council. These situations allowed 
officials and politicians to invest diplomatic resources on human security policies to 
take initiative and show influence in this area in the world. 
 Japan had existing ODA policy as strength supporting the decision to take 
leadership in human security policies on “freedom from want”. Japan is the biggest 
supplier of ODA, which have been focusing on the economic developmental and 
poverty issues in the world, from 1989 to 2001. In fact, in 2003, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi put emphasis on that the ODA policies which have been long 
conducted from 1954 by Japan, shared basic idea with the human security even before 
the concept of “human security” appeared and received attention as a “new” concept.  
 
Japan has in recent years been moving toward an approach to 
global problems that focuses on the issues affecting individual 
humans, and this concept of “human security” has been gaining 
ground internationally. Japan‟s official development assistance 





The on-going ODA policy shared basic focus, such as support of self-help of the 
recipients, attention on basic human needs and respect of human rights, with the 
“freedom from fear” aspect of human security. This fact supported Japan‟s leadership 
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oriented policy on human security issues. At the same time, in regard to Japanese ODA 
policy itself, introducing the new idea to combine and re-labeled the existing policy 
directions and principles accumulated from 1954
262
. 
 Japanese ODA policies started as a part of war reparations to Asian countries in 
1954. In 1958, Japan provided yen loan to India apart from the war reparations. In the 
beginning, “ODA was first driven by political motivations to rebuild disrupted political 
and economic relations with Asian countries”
263
. As Japanese economy developed, the 
yen loan was increased motivated by “expanding export markets for Japan and securing 
imports of important raw materials, and there were high expectations of a beneficial 
effect from these actions for the Japanese economy”
264
. Thus, the government placed 
ODA as the main pillar of international contribution of Japan and, at the same time, one 
of the international trade strategies.  
 In the 1970s and 1980s, the World Bank and World Health Organization 
proposed to put higher priority on “Basic Human Needs (BHN)” in global aid programs. 
This idea shifted the focus of the foreign aid to issues of poverty in developing countries 
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from supporting such countries to develop their economy
265
. In response to this 
international momentum, the Japanese ODA polices also widened the view to the BHN 
from developmental aid
266
.   
 The amount of the ODA increased almost ten times larger from a total of 
US$115.8 million in 1964 to US$1.1049 billion in 1976. Also, the government realized 
the political and diplomatic impact of ODA, not only impacts on Japanese international 
trade. This recognition could be observed in the four ODA Guidelines announced in 
1991: 
 
a) Environmental Conservation and development should be 
pursued in tandem, 
b) Use of ODA for military purposes should be avoided, 
c) Full attentions should be paid to trends in recipient countries‟ 
military expenders and productions of weapons of mass 
destruction, 
d) Full attention should be paid to efforts for democratization, 
market-oriented economics, human rights and freedom in 
recipient countries. 
 
The ODA Charter presented basic aims and principals of the ODA policies in June 1992. 
In this Charter, the growing attention on political and diplomatic effects became definite. 
It stated the expectation of political effect, which is to establish and promote friendly 
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relationship with the recipient countries, as a result of the ODA
267
. Therefore, the 
existing ODA policies were ready to be combined and support the Japan‟s political 
leadership on human security as diplomatic resource.  
 At the same time, existing ODA policy needed principles to improve its quality 
and political effectiveness in the late 1990s. Despite the position as the biggest 
contributor of ODA, the recognition of Japan‟s commitment from the world was not as 
great as the government desired in the late 1980s and 1990s. “Japan‟s initiatives, while 
commendable in their size and potential impact, [did] not herald the rise of a new aid 
leader.
268
” Also, while Japan suffered from recession in the late 1990s, Japan's budget 
for ODA was reduced by 30% in seven years from 1997. The emphasis of the ODA 
policy had to shift from quantity to quality and political effectiveness. The idea of 
human security, which appeared in the various contexts in Japan from the late 1990s, 
was considered to provide the thematic unity and be an appealing label for the ODA 
policy in transition. 
 
New ODA Guideline 
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 The Japanese government could combine the renewed ODA guideline, which 
was presented in 2003, and its human security policies. Official foreign aid in 
accordance with the famous concept of human security is expected to be the niche for 
Japan in an international society
269
. The concept of human security is one of five the 
five key concepts in the new guideline that expected to attract people both in and out of 
Japan.  
 
1, Supporting self-help efforts of developing countries 
2, Perspective of “Human Security” 
3, Assurance of fairness 
4, Utilization of Japan's experience and expertise 




The ODA guideline was revised in 2003 for the first time in 11 years after it 
had been made. This revise widely reflected the global changes, such as the end of Cold 
War, growing globalization, the 9.11, and shifts of international focus on developmental 
issues, and the domestic criticism of ODA policies regarding the lack of consistent 
strategies and effectiveness as a diplomatic tool
271
. At the same time, reorganizing the 
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) was in progress due to the challenging 
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financial situation. The government applied the new concept of human security as a 
symbol of a new ODA policy direction. Japan's new ODA Charter presented in 2003 
provides the concept of human security as a key perspective.   
   
 (2) Perspective of "Human Security" 
In order to address direct threats to individuals such as conflicts, 
disasters, infectious diseases, it is important not only to consider the 
global, regional, and national perspectives, but also to consider the 
perspective of human security, which focuses on individuals. 
Accordingly, Japan will implement ODA to strengthen the capacity 
of local communities through human resource development. To 
ensure that human dignity is maintained at all stages, from the 
conflict stage to the reconstruction and development stages, Japan 





 The appointment of Mrs. Sadako Ogata, who was the co-chair of the World 
Commission on Human Security, as the president of the JICA was expected to support 
the implement of ODA policies featuring the concept of human security, and also 
domestically and internationally appeal the new ODA in accordance with the idea of 
human security. The concept of human security is closely connected to ODA in Japan. 
Generally, the government of Japan puts the concept in the context of ODA policies, not 
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3. International Conditions  
 As chapter 4 indicated, secondly powers require certain support from 
international actors to take initiative and/or show strong influence in international 
politics. Firstly, the United Nations was moving toward accepting the new concept of 
human security and including the idea as one of main ideas and worked in cooperate 
with Japan and other human security advocators. The Fund is administered by the 
several UN agencies in cooperation; UNDP, the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
























Existing ODA policy and 




(Source: author based on Kingdom‟s 
Policy Windows framework) 
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and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and the World Health Organization (WHO).  
 In addition to this operational support, mentioning Japan as an active supporter 
or the attendance to meetings by the UN officials and the Secretary enhances Japanese 
policies‟ legitimacy. For example, Secretary General of the United Nations Kofi Annan 
gave a speech at the Diet of Japan in February 4th 2004and mentioned the contributions 
of Japan; “The world will not achieve the Millennium Development Goals without 
Japan's technological prowess and its focus on “human security.”
274
 Dr. Kemal Dervish, 
the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) also visited 
Japan in 2005 and 2006 to attend symposium on human security held by Japan.  
 Secondly, the Japanese policies, which put emphasis on the “freedom from 
want,” and the flexible attitude regarding the definition was welcomed by developing 
countries and Asian countries. The idea of human security made some developing 
countries anxious about the possibility that the idea might invite frequent interference in 
the internal affairs and “humanitarian interventions” from developed countries‟ view. 
Knowing this apprehension, the Japanese government took a very cautious attitude to 
the “freedom from fear” aspect of the idea of human security and deliberately put 
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emphasis on its focus on the developmental and economic aspect. For example, 
diplomats and politicians representing Japan intentionally mention “poverty” every time 
whenever they were listing threats for human security up in their speeches in the UN. 
This was previously arranged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs back in Japan to 
clarify Japan‟s position and ease the developing countries‟ apprehension
275
. Also the 
simplified images of the contrast between Canada which was promoting the “freedom 
from fear” and Japan which was promoting “freedom from want” made it easy to 
understand that Japan was supporting the developmental and economic aspect of the 
idea of human security
276
. Thus, in developing countries mind, Japanese policies led to 
economic aid but intervention
277
. Japan received a favorable response from 
Non-Aligned Movement members and developing countries for these position and 
attitude
278
.   
  Thirdly, the human security concept in the new ODA guideline was welcomed 
by ODA receivers. Japan held workshops and meetings in several countries which were 
receiving ODA from Japan. These meetings resulted in exporting the idea of human 
security under the Japanese government‟s initiative and incorporated the idea of human 
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security into the ODA plans. For example, the Japanese government held a workshop 
discussing the ODA for the Republic of Bolivia in 2004. After the meeting, the 
President Carlos D. Ness Gisbert announced a new social development plan of the 
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 The main aim of this research is to clarify the concept of “middle power” and 
to employ the idea to understand the conditions that allow intermediate powers, 
particularly, “possible middle powers” in this research‟s definition, to exercise strong 
influence and take initiative through international co-operation, regimes, or 
organizations on certain issues.  
 This research involved three processes of examination presented in five 
chapters. Part I of the thesis which consists of Chapter 1 and 2, contains history and 
literature review of the idea “middle power”. The review indicates that there is 
confusion surrounding the political term and the academic analytical tool because of the 
origin and beginning of middle power studies. In addition, there is certain confusion 
surrounding middle power diplomacy and Canadian diplomacy because Canada was 
describing itself as a “middle power” while it was conducting the middlepowermanship 
policies in the 1960s. Based on these facts, this research suggests to strictly distinguish 
middlepowermanship as one diplomatic strategy from policies conducted by “middle 
power,” as a country with middle ranked national power, and those by self-indicated 
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middle powers. Certain countries have middlepowermanship strategy as one of the 
strategy to take leadership in international issues.  
In Part II, chapter 3 located the idea of middle power and middle power 
literature in IR. Both middle power studies and IR research projects attempt to classify 
and label countries in a hierarchical order based on national power institutional systems 
and recognition; however, IR hardly moved to examining the general characteristics or 
behavioral patterns of each category. In addition, any of the three approaches classify 
countries shared in IR and middle power studies cannot categorize countries objectively. 
Therefore, this research assumes classifications of states are flexible and changing along 
with issues and time periods and focuses on understanding the behavior. Also, The 
behavioral approach to middle power is unique to middle power studies and different 
from other IR approaches. Moreover, the behavioral approach in the middle power 
studies appeared to be the most suitable basis for the analysis in this research to 
understand the middlepowermanship.  
 Chapter 4 presented modified analytical framework to understand 
middlepowermanship based on behavioral approach in middle power studies and studies 
of agenda setting process.  This research assumes the middle power diplomacy or 
middlepowermanship in this research has theoretically four main features. Firstly 
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middlepowermanship means taking leadership employing cooperation with other actors, 
including other countries and international organizations, international organizations 
and international institutions rather than just its own national power. Secondly, this type 
of leadership tends to be entrepreneurial or intellectual leadership, which does not 
always require massive national power and resource input. Thirdly, this diplomatic 
option is basically available to very wide range of countries, classified as “possible 
middle powers” in this research, as one of the policy options. Fourth, the country 
applying middle power diplomacy does not always describe itself as “middle power”; in 
addition, the country calling itself “middle power” is not always conducting middle 
power diplomacy. The political rhetoric “middle power” and middle power diplomacy is 
not always inter-related. Lastly, only under certain conditions this policy is chosen and 
successfully practiced. One distinguishable feature of this research is that it is not 
assuming the neither “possible middle powers” nor self-indicated middle powers always 
apply middle power diplomacy. The “possible middle powers” have 
middlepowermanship strategy as an available option. 
 The “possible middle powers” have middlepowermanship strategy as an 
available option and decide whether middlepowemanship strategy is practicable and 
effective or not on a case by case basis. This research suggested that if “possible middle 
159 
powers” seek to show strong influence and leadership, they have to select issues and 
approaches which their limited diplomatic resource can accomplish. For this selection 
of issues, firstly, there needs to be domestic agreement. In other words, domestic 
support and available diplomatic resource have to become available on the right 
political timing. Particularly for “possible middle powers” the constraints and available 
resources strongly affect the countries‟ approaches to the large scale international policy 
and new projects. Secondly, “possible middle powers” need to persuade other 
international actors for support and co-operation to excise international leadership 
because of their limited national and diplomatic capability.  
 As Part III of this thesis, Chapter 5 presented a case study on Japanese 
diplomacy on human security. Japanese active policies under the name of human 
security were middlepowemanship because of the three following features. Firstly, 
Japanese human security policy has been conducted in cooperation with the United 
Nations and other countries. Secondly, the Japanese government was seeking the 
entrepreneurial leadership and influence in these policies. Thirdly, the government 
consistently put emphasis on the aspect of “freedom from want” of human security and 
limited its initiative to economy related issues.  
This case study focuses on factors underlying the policy decision choosing 
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middlepowermanship. Prime Minister Obuchi‟s leadership backed up his intellectual 
advisors who were supporting the idea of “human security” was matched by the 
political timing brought by the Asian financial crisis and the Ottawa Process in 1997. 
The constraints and available diplomatic resources led the Japanese government to take 
the middlepowermanship approach for international leadership.  
The government had certain constraints due to the on constitutional restraints in 
military activities and complexity of relationships with neighboring countries. These 
restrictions on the approaches resulted in Japanese policies to have limited initiative 
only on economy related issues even though the idea of human security contains 
“freedom from want” and “freedom from fear.” Combining with the existing Japanese 
Official Development Assistance (ODA) policies and upcoming ODA policy reform 
realized the human security as a large scale international initiative, such as the Trust 
Found for Human Security. In the international sphere, support from other countries and 
the UN made it possible for Japan to conduct such large scale international policy 
conducted by Japan. 
 In conclusion, integrating the three steps of examination above, this research 
clarified conditions and background for “possible middle powers” to apply 
middlepowermanship to exercise strong influence and take initiative through 
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international co-operation, regimes, or organizations in certain cases. Although the case 
study on Japan showed the framework this research presented is applicable to 
understand the one particular Japan‟s case of middlepowermanship, this research has 
some limitation on its argument due to the limited number of case studies. Japan is a 
good example to show the flexibility of the distinction between middle and great power 
diplomacy. However, to examine small power diplomacy and middle power diplomacy, 






1. The List of “Small Powers” in narrow definition 
The list of micro states based on the definition “countries with populations of less 
than one million” and data available at the UN Statistics, failed states based on the 
Failed States Index 2008, and Least Developed Countries based on UN-OHRLLS.  
Micro States (46) Failed States (60) LDCs(50) Total(124) 
Åland Islands  Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan 
American Samoa  Angola Angola Åland Islands  
Anguilla Balarus Bangladesh American Samoa  
Aruba Bangladesh Benin Angola 
Bahamas Bhutan Bhutan Anguilla 
Bahrain  Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Aruba 
Barbados  Bolivia Burundi Bahamas 
Belize Bosnia Cambodia Bahrain  





Brunei Darussalam  Cambodia Chad Barbados  
Cape Verde  Cameroon Comoros Belize 








Chad Djibouti Bermuda  
Channel Islands: 
Jersey  
Colombia Equatorial Guinea Bhutan 
China: Macao SAR  
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
Eritrea Bolivia 
Cook Islands  East Timor Ethiopia Bosnia 
Cyprus  Egypt Gambia Brunei Darussalam  
Faeroe Islands  Equatorial Guinea Guniea Burkina Faso 
Fiji  Eritrea Guinea-Bissau Burma 
French Guiana  Georgia Haiti Burundi 
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Greenland  Haiti Leaotho Cape Verde 
Guadeloupe Israel/West Bank Liberia Cayman Islands  
Guam11 Indonesia Madagascar 
Central African 
Republic 
Guyana Iran Malawi Chad 
Iceland  Iraq Maldives 
Channel Islands: 
Guernsey  
Liechtenstein Ivoy Coast Mali 
Channel Islands: 
Jersey  
Luxembourg Kenya Mauritania China: Macao SAR  
Maldives Kirgistan Mozambique Colombia 
Malta  Laos Myanmar Comoros 
Marshall Islands  Lebanon Nepal Cook Islands  
Martinique Liberia Niger Cyprus  
Netherlands Antilles  Malawi Rwanda 
Dem. Rep. of the 
Congo 
Niue  Martitania Somoa 
Democratic 





Sao Tome and 
Principe 
Djibouti 
Qatar Nepal Senegal East Timor 
Saint Lucia  Niger Sierra Leone Egypt 
Samoa Nigeria Solomon Islands Equatorial Guinea 
San Marino  North Korea Somalia Eritrea 
Sao Tome and 
Principe  
Pakistan Sudan Ethiopia 
Seychelles Papua New Guinea Timor-Leate Faeroe Islands  
Solomon Islands  Philippines Togo Fiji  
Turks Caicos Islands  Republic of Congo Tuvalu French Guiana  
United States Virgin 
Islands  
Rthiopia Uganda French Polynesia  
Vanuatu Rwanda United Republic Gambia 
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Tanzania 
  Sierra Leone Vanuatu Georgia 
  Solomon Island Yemen Gibraltar 
  Somalia Zambia Greenland  
  Sri Lanka   Guadeloupe 
  Sudan   Guam11 
  Syria   Guinea 
  Tajikistan    Guinea-Bissau 
  Togo   Guyana 
  Turkmenstan   Haiti 
  Uganda   Israel/West Bank 
  Uzbekistan   Iceland  
  Yemen   Indonesia 
  Zimbabwe   Iran 
      Iraq 
      Ivoy Coast 
      Kenya 
      Kirgistan 
      Kiribati 




      Laos 
      Leaotho 
      Lebanon 
      Liberia 
      Liechtenstein 
      Luxembourg 
      Madagascar 
      Malawi 
      Maldives 
      Mali 
      Malta  
      Marshall Islands  
      Martinique 
      Martitania 
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      Mauritania 
      Moldova 
      Mozambique 
      Myanmar 
      Nepal 
      Netherlands Antilles  
      Niger 
      Nigeria 
      Niue  
      North Korea 
      
Northern Mariana 
Islands  
      Pakistan 
      Papua New Guinea 
      Philippines 
      Qatar 
      Republic of Congo 
      Rthiopia 
      Rwanda 
      Saint Lucia  
      Samoa 
      San Marino  
      
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
      Senegal 
      Seychelles 
      Sierra Leone 
      Solomon Island 
      Somalia 
      Somoa 
      Sri Lanka 
      Sudan 
      Syria 
      Tajikistan  
      Timor-Leate 
      Togo 
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      Turkmenstan 
      Turks Caicos Islands  
      Tuvalu 
      Uganda 
      
United Republic 
Tanzania 
      
United States Virgin 
Islands  
      Uzbekistan 
      Vanuatu 
      Yemen 
      Zambia 




2. The list of Non-Permanent Member of the UNSC 
Country Times years 
Japan 10 
1958 – 1959, 1966 – 1967, 1971 – 1972, 1975 – 1976, 1981 – 1982, 
1987 – 1988, 1992 – 1993, 1997 – 1998, 2005 – 2006, 2009 – 2010 
Brazil 9 
1946 – 1947, 1951 – 1952, 1954 – 1955, 1963 – 1964, 1967 – 1968, 
1988 – 1989, 1993 – 1994, 1998 – 1999, 2004 – 2005  
Argentina 8 
1948 – 1949, 1959 – 1960, 1966 – 1967, 1971 – 1972, 1987 – 1988, 
1994 – 1995, 1999 – 2000, 2005 – 2006 
Belgium 5 1947 – 1948, 1955 – 1956, 1971 – 1972, 1991 – 1992, 2007 – 2008 
Canada 5 
1948 – 1949, 1958 – 1959, 1967 – 1968, 1977 – 1978, 1989 – 1990, 
1999 – 2000 
Colombia 5 
1947 – 1948, 1953 – 1954, 1957 – 1958, 1969 – 1970, 1989 – 1990, 
2001 – 2002 
India 5 
1950 – 1951, 1967 – 1968, 1972 – 1973, 1977 – 1978, 1984 – 1985, 
1991 – 1992 
Italy 5 
1959 – 1960, 1971 – 1972, 1975 – 1976, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 
2007 – 2008 
Netherlands 5 1946, 1951 – 1952, 1965 – 1966, 1983 – 1984, 1999 – 2000 
Pakistan 5 
1952 – 1953, 1968 – 1969, 1976 – 1977, 1983 – 1984, 1993 – 1994, 
2003 – 2004 
Panama 5 1958 – 1959, 1972 – 1973, 1976 – 1977, 1981 – 1982, 2007 – 2008 
Australia 4 1946 – 1947, 1956 – 1957, 1973 – 1974, 1985 – 1986 
Chile 4 1952 – 1953, 1961 – 1962, 1996 – 1997, 2003 – 2004  
Costa Rica 4 1974 – 1975, 1997 – 1998, 2008 – 2009  
Denmark 4 1953 – 1954, 1967 – 1968, 1985 – 1986, 2005 – 2006  
Egypt 4 1946, 1949 – 1950, 1984 – 1985, 1996 – 1997 
Germany 4 1977 – 1978, 1987 – 1988, 1995 – 1996, 2003 – 2004  
Mexico 4 1946, 1980 – 1981, 2002 – 2003, 2009 – 2010 
Norway 4 1949 – 1950, 1963 – 1964, 1979 – 1980, 2001 – 2002  
Peru 4 1955 – 1956, 1973 – 1974, 1984 – 1985, 2006 – 2007  
Polippines 4 1957, 1963, 1980 – 1981, 2004 – 2005 
Poland 4 1946 – 1947, 1960, 1970 – 1971, 1982 – 1983, 1996 – 1997 
Romania 4 1962, 1976 – 1977, 1990 – 1991, 2004 – 2005  
Spain 4 1969 – 1970, 1981 – 1982, 1993 – 1994, 2003 – 2004 
Turkey 4 1951 – 1952, 1954 – 1955, 1961, 2009 – 2010 
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Venezuela 4 1962 – 1963, 1977 – 1978, 1986 – 1987, 1992 – 1993 
Yugoslavia 4 1950 – 1951, 1956, 1972 – 1973, 1988 – 1989 
Algeria 3 1968 – 1969, 1988 – 1989, 2004 – 2005 
Austria 3 1973 – 1974, 1991 – 1992, 2009 – 2010 
Bulgaria 3 1966 – 1967, 1986 – 1987, 2002 – 2003 
Cuba 3 1949 – 1950, 1956 – 1957, 1990 – 1991  
Ecuador 3 1950 – 1951, 1960 – 1961, 1991 – 1992 
Ghana 3 1962 – 1963, 1986 – 1987, 2006 – 2007 
Indonesia 3 1973 – 1974, 1995 – 1996, 2007 – 2008 
Ireland 3 1962, 1981 – 1982, 2001 – 2002 
Malasia 3 1965, 1989 – 1990, 1999 – 2000 
New Zealand 3 1954 – 1955, 1966, 1993 – 1994 
Nigeria 3 1966 – 1967, 1978 – 1979, 1994 – 1995  
Sweden 3 1957 – 1958, 1975 – 1976, 1997 – 1998 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
3 1947 – 1948, 1970 – 1971, 2002 – 2003 
Tunisia 3 1959 – 1960, 1980 – 1981, 2000 – 2001 
Uganda 3 1966, 1981 – 1982, 2009 – 2010 
Ukraine 3 1948 – 1949, 1984 – 1985, 2000 – 2001 
Zambia 3 1969 – 1970, 1979 – 1980, 1987 – 1988 
Bangladesh 2 1979 – 1980, 2000 – 2001 
Benin 2 1976 – 1977, 2004 – 2005 
Bolivia 2 1964 – 1965, 1978 – 1979 
Burkina Faso 2 1984 – 1985, 2008 – 2009 
Cameroon 2 1974 – 1975, 2002 – 2003  
Congo 2 1986 – 1987, 2006 – 2007 
Cote d'lovire 2 1964 – 1965, 1990 – 1991  




2 1982 – 1983, 1990 – 1991  
Ethiopia 2 1967 – 1968, 1989 – 1990 
Finland 2 1969 – 1970, 1989 – 1990 
Gabon 2 1978 – 1979, 1998 – 1999 
Greece 2 1952 – 1953, 2005 – 2006 
Guinea 2 1972 – 1973, 2002 – 2003  
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Guyana 2 1975 – 1976, 1982 – 1983 
Hungary 2 1968 – 1969, 1992 – 1993 
Iraq 2 1957 – 1958, 1974 – 1975 
Jamaica 2 1979 – 1980, 2000 – 2001 
Jordan 2 1965 – 1966, 1982 – 1983  
Kenya 2 1973 – 1974, 1997 – 1998 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
2 1976 – 1977, 2008 – 2009 
Mali 2 1966 – 1967, 2000 – 2001 
Maritius 2 1977 – 1978, 2001 – 2002 
Morocco 2 1963 – 1964, 1992 – 1993 
Nepal 2 1969 – 1970, 1988 – 1989  
Nicaragua 2 1970 – 1971, 1983 – 1984 
Portugal 2 1979 – 1980, 1997 – 1998 




2 1975 – 1976, 2005 – 2006  
Zimbabwe 2 1983 – 1984, 1991 – 1992 
Angola 1 2003 – 2004 
Bahrain 1 1998 – 1999  
Belarus 1 1974 – 1975 
Botswana 1 1995 – 1996 
Burundi 1 1970 – 1971  
Cape Verde 1 1992 – 1993  
Croatia 1 2008 – 2009 
Czech 
Republic 
1 1994 – 1995  
Djibouti 1 1993 – 1994 
Gambia 1 1998 – 1999 
Guinea-Bissau 1 1996 – 1997  
Honduras 1 1995 – 1996 
Iran 1 1955 – 1956 
Kuwait 1 1978 – 1979 
Lebanon 1 1953 – 1954  
Liberia 1 1961 
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Madagascar 1 1985 – 1986 
Malta 1 1983 – 1984 
Mauritania 1 1974 – 1975 
Namibia 1 1999 – 2000 
Niger 1 1980 – 1981 
Oman 1 1994 – 1995  
Paraguay 1 1968 – 1969 
Qatar 1 2006 – 2007 
Republic of 
Korea 
1 1996 – 1997  
Rwanda 1 1994 – 1995  
Sierra Leone 1 1970 – 1971  
Singapore 1 2001 – 2002  
Slovakia 1 2006 – 2007  
Slovenia 1 1998 – 1999 
Somalia 1 1971 – 1972  
South Africa 1 2007 – 2008  
Sri lanka 1 1960 – 1961 
Sudan 1 1972 – 1973  
Thailand 1 1985 – 1986  
Togo 1 1982 – 1983 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
1 1985 – 1986  
United Arab 
Emirates 
1 1986 – 1987  
United Arab 
Republic 
1 1961 – 1962 
Uruguay 1 1965 – 1966  
Viet Nam 1 2008 – 2009  
Yemen 1 1990 – 1991  
 




3. List of Prime Ministers of Japan after the Second World War 
45
th
 Shigeru Yoshida May 1946-May 1947 
46
th
 Teatu Katayama May 1947-March 1948 
47th Hitoshi Ashida March 1948-October 1948 
48th Shigeru Yoshida October 1948-Feburary 1949 
49
th
 February 1949-October 1952 
50
th
 October 1952-May 1953 
51
st
 May 1953-December 1954 
52
nd
 Ichiro Hatoyama December 1954-March 1955 
53
rd
 March1955- November 1955 
54
th
 November 1955-December 1956 
55
th
 Tanzan Ishida December 1956-Feburary 1957 
56
th
 Nobusuke Kishi February 1957-June 1958 
57
th
 June1958- July1960 
58
th
 Hayato Ikeda July 1960-Decmber 1960 
59
th
 December 1960- December 1963 
60
th
 December 1963-November1964 
61
st
 Eisaku Sato November 1964-Feburary 1967 
62
nd
 February 1967-Janurary 1970 
63
rd
 January 1970-July 1972 
64
th
 Kakuei Tanaka July 1972-December 1972 
64
th
 December 1972- December 1974 
66
th
 Takeo Miki December1974-December1976 
67
th
 Takeo Fukuda December1976-December 1978 
68
th
 Masayoshi Oohira December 1978-November 1979 
69
th
 November 1979-June 1980 
70
th
 Zenkou Suzuki July 1980-November 1982 
71
st
 Yasuhiro Nakasone November 1982- December 1983 
72
nd
 December 1983-July 1986 
73
rd
 July 1986-November 1987  
74
th
 Noboru Takeshita November1987-June1989 
75
th
 Sousuke Uno June 1989- August 1989 
76
th
 Toshiki Kaifu August 1989-Feburary 1990 
77
th








































 Kiichi Miyazawa November 1991-August 1993 
79
th
 Morihiro Hosokawa August 1993-April1994 
80
th
 Tsutomu Hata April1994-June1994 
81
st
 Tomiichi Murayama June1994-Juanuary 1996 
82
nd
 Ryutaro Hashimoto January 1996-November1996 
83
rd
 November1996-July 1998  
84
th
 Keizo Obuchi July1998-April 2000 
85
th
 Yoshiro Mori April 2000-July 2000 
86
th
 July 2000-April 2001 
87
th
 Zyuiichiro Koizumi April 2001-November 2003 
88
th
 November 2003-September 2005 
89
th
 September 2005- September 2006 
90
th
 Shinzo Abe September 2006-September 2007 
91
st
 Yasuo Fukuda September 2007-September 2008 
92
nd
 Taro Aso September 2008-present 
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4. Time table of Japan’s Human security Policies from 1994 to 2007. 
Year Japan World 
  Prime Minister 





















(Jun. 11 ) 
Yukihiko Ikeda  
(Jan. 11) 
    
1997 
Keizo Obuchi  
(Sep.11) 








Keizo Obuchi  
(Aug. 30) 
Masahiko Takamura  
(Jul.30) 
    
1999 






Yoshiro Mori  
(Apr. 5) 
    
2001 
Zyunichiro Koizumi  
(Apr. 26) 




9.11 attack/  
Afghanistan war 
2002 Yoriko Kawaguchi  
(Feb.1) 
    










    
2006 
Shinzo Abe  
(Sep.26) 




Yasuo Fukuda  
(Sep. 26) 
Nobutaka Machimura  
(Sep.27) 
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